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HABEAS SCHOLASTICA: AN OMBUDSMAN FOR
ACADEMIC DUE PROCESS-A PROPOSAL
Luis KUTNER*
"As life is action and passion, it is required of a man that he should
share the passion and action of his time, at the peril of being judged
not to have lived."
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
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The mood of the militant segment of world university students can
best be described as angry, bewildered, anxiety-ridden, confused, appre-
hensive and vandalistic. With incredible naivet6 concerning world affairs,
they vent their frustration and social hostility on the internal affairs of
the university. Ego-driven, they strive for momentary applause and lime-
light in the word-cloak of deprecatory bombast. Their appeals are instan-
taneous, and just as rapidly their appeals are relegated to the limbo of
clichds mired in intellectual buncombe.
In the main, the restraint of university officials has been remarkable,
avoiding engagement in reciprocal demagoguery. However, the Establish-
ment has been insulated in not anticipating the ever-mounting ground-
swell of student tension, particularly that of the negro and those in
empathy. The social scientists have been caught flat-footed and quick-
sanded in their redundant platitudes of "continued education," "economic
security," "the decay of religious faith," "domestic and political discrep-
ancy," etc., ad nauseum.
Students, as young men and women who have yet to assume a posi-
tion of power and authority, are in all ages free to act irresponsibly. They
become frustrated because of their inability to make meaningful decisions
and seek to find a release for their emotions. Insurrection and quasi-
organized chaos are great catalysts for the liberation of the creative striv-
ings of genes and chromosomes. Today this striving is commingled with
heightened idealism seeking a vague goal, a yearning for anarchism.
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The experience of higher education has now become available to an
ever-expanding segment of society. College attendance is now available
to the masses, as approximately 6.5 million persons attend colleges in the
United States and within a decade this number is expected to increase
to 10 million.' A similar development has occurred in the other relatively
affluent societies of the Western World. The university has, therefore, be-
come a mass phenomenon, a product of the industrial revolution and the
more recent cybernetics breakthrough. Men, in ever-increasing numbers,
have come to have access to the gratification of their physical wants. The
university has come to be a means for this gratification by the admission
of people from all socio-economic classes. At the Sorbonne, this phenome-
non has resulted in a student upheaval to change an educational structure
which has historically been geared to the aristocracy. 2 But the phenome-
non of the masses entering the universities leads, in this writer's opinion,
to a lowering of standards with even the acquisition of a doctorate be-
coming a commonplace occurrence. The lowering of standards is perhaps
dramatized by the infiltration of members of the underworld into the
Sorbonne during the student occupation of that famed institution. The
masses, being irrational, seek direction. The mass penetration of the uni-
versity has resulted in its depersonalization as students are referred to
as numbers.
The student unrest and the rise of the New Left are in part protests
against this phenomenon. It is a revolt against the affluent materialism
and idolatry of contemporary society. The students protest the machine.
It should be stressed that this revolt reflects the strivings of only a small
minority of the masses who have proliferated in the universities, for the
vast majority are content to be directed and to conform. Only the sensi-
tive souls revolt. But these sensitive minds seek to stimulate the masses
in protest against the evils remaining in society, such as the fact that
segments of society-negroes and other minority groups-have yet not
joined the ranks of the relatively affluent and are not part of the Estab-
lishment. They further seek to dramatize the immorality of tolerating evil,
viz., segregation, violence in Viet Nam, the threat of thermonuclear an-
nihilation.3
The protest of the New Left involves a crisis in Western society.
The problem, perceived by Ortega in the 1930's, is the inability to cope
with the complex problems created by contemporary technology.' The
complex subtlety of modern problems has not penetrated within the grasp
of most men. Contemporary leaders are beset with ignorance of historical
1. How Good Is the Megaversity, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1968, at 78. See generally A.
FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVI DISOBEDIENCE (1968). Justice Fortas has done an
invaluable service for the entire world, and his cogent thoughts are indeed a mountaintop of
legal reasoning.
2. Geraghty, Ancient Sorbonne Faces Take-Over by Students, University of Paris, Chicago
Sun-Times, June 12, 1960.
3. See generally J. NEwFIELD, A PRoPHETIC MmoarrY (1966).
4. ORTEGA Y GASSET, REVOLT OF THE MASSES 51 (1952).
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perspective and principles. Ortega perceived not only the Russian Revo-
lution but also a repetition of the previous revolution, decrying the "mo-
notonous repetition of revolution."' The question before mankind today
is whether what is being experienced is indeed revolution or is in reality
involution, the retrogression from previous positions of progress. The un-
rest may lead to a garrison state wherein individual liberties are sup-
pressed and notions of due process are ignored or vitiated. Fear has been
expressed that the student campus upheavals may lead to a situation cur-
tailing academic freedom. The basic issue besetting contemporary society
is the ability to resolve social conflicts within the context of the rule of
law-to reaffirm faith in this rule as alone capable of reconciling the jar-
ring interests of all and of blending into one harmonious union the dis-
cordant materials of which society is composed.
Feeling powerless to act, they resort to civil disobedience. The im-
mediate target is the university. The revolt arises spontaneously, as at
Berkeley.' There is no formal organization, not even the selection of lead-
ers. The mass political action becomes a form of theater, characterized
by the demonstration, but as a therapeutic device, aimed not for the re-
ceptivity of an audience but for its effect on the participants. The tech-
niques of this action are nonviolent, though they occasionally degenerate
into violence. The means for achieving justice is through civil disobedi-
ence, which has played a vital role in the growth and establishment of
American civil liberties and in the quest for justice.
The problem, however, is to make the expression of this dissent non-
violent. If it is to be disruptive, it cannot disregard the rights of others.'
However, dissent must be encompassed within the rule of law. The legal
and institutional processes must devise means for the constructive chan-
neling of diverse outlooks into social adjustment. The student revolt must
be permitted, within an institutional setting, to bring forth a new ordering.
As William S. Paley, a life-time trustee of Columbia University, observed,
"The acceptance of violence as an instrument of progress indicates that
something is clearly and radically wrong with our universities .... ." and
that universities are "open ended ventures; selective of the past, critical
of the present, and oriented to the future," to be looked at afresh.8
The young adult, living in contemporary society, has grown up in
an absurd situation. He has been instilled with the ideals of a tradition
stemming from the Enlightenment and the American and French Revo-
lutions which stressed the importance of the individual, freedom from
authority imposed without one's consent, and the ability of man to eradi-
cate social evil. But he grew up in a period which experienced Auschwitz,
Eichmann, Hitler, and Hiroshima. He lives in a society where creativity
5. Id. at 49.
6. RossM", BREAKTHROUGH AT BERKELEY.
7. See generally A. FORTAS, supra note 1.
8. W. Paley, Commencement of U. of Penn., May 20, 1968, as in Stretch, The Ordeal of
Academic Revolt, SATURDAY REviEW, June 15, 1968, at 62.
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is thwarted by the alienation of the personality as induced by deperson-
alized automation. From his entrance in school he is pressured to compete
as a means for demonstrating his ability. He enters a university which
has become a depersonalized bureaucracy to which he must adapt within
the context of a constant "rat race." Understandably, he develops an
anxiety and seeks a means for releasing the tension between ideals and
reality-between being a person and an individual. He seeks to implement
the ideals which have been transmitted within him. The university be-
comes the symbolic vehicle for his frustration. It is the convenient uni-
versity that is besieged for rage-frustration and ego catharsis.
From Turin to Tokyo, college student demonstrations have erupted
to protest and resist academic and governmental authority at the social
establishment. 9 Without apparent centralized direction, a spontaneous in-
ternational movement of student protest has emerged which transcends
political, cultural and ideological boundaries. Student unrest has been
manifested in Soviet-dominated countries such as Czechoslovakia (where
student pressure contributed to the overthrow of the old-line Stalinist
regime) and Poland. Students have challenged the authoritarian domina-
tion in Spain, while in France a student revolt at the Sorbonne in opposi-
tion to archaic educational policies has been the catalyst for a general
strike.' 0 In the German Federal Republic and in West Berlin, student
protests have likewise challenged educational policies and protested the
proposed enactment by the Bundestag of legislation to empower the gov-
ernment to suspend constitutional guarantees during emergencies."
The United States has likewise witnessed the eruption of a series of
student revolts on college campuses throughout the nation. The first of
the student revolts occurred at the University of California in Berkeley
in 1964 with the Free Speech movement.' 2 The university administration
9. NEWSWEEK, May 6, 1968, at 45; Comments of Joseph C. Harsh, CHRISTIAN SCIENCz
MONITOR, May 31, 1968, at 1.
10. New York Times (late city edition), May 17, 1968, at 14, col. 1.
11. NEWSWEEK, supra note 9; New York Times, May 17, 1968, at 14, col. 1.
12. T. EMERSON & D. HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES at
1065 (1957). [Hereinafter cited as EMERSON & HABER]; S. LIPSET & S. WOLIN (eds.), THE
BERKELEY STUDENT REVOLT (1965); M. MILLER & S. GILMORE (eds.), REVOLUTION AT
BERKELEY (1965); H. DRAPER, BERKELEY: THE NEW STUDENT REVOLT (1965).
In judicial review of university expulsions of students and teachers, courts have reversed
the prevailing law that a college has the right to dismisss students at any time for any reason
without revelation of the reason other than its being for the general good of the institution
and that there was no requirement that formal charges be presented or a hearing be held
prior to expulsion by school authorities. Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 186 F.
Supp. 945, 951-52 (M.D. Ala. 1960), rev'd, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961). The intrusion of the expression of due process was inevitable since justice
was outraged by the denial to students of the normal safeguards given to a pickpocket.
Seavey, Dismissal of Students: Due Process, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1406-07 (1957). Since uni-
versities have become battlegrounds and blackpower has become the euphemism for black
tyranny, articulate fanatics who vocalize thoughts without knowledge have created a gloomy
caveat over the province of educational institutions. Due process, rather than being rigid and
technical, is in fact a flexible and functional instrument of justice. Pursuant to the fourteenth
amendment, procedural safeguards limited solely to governmental action and heretofore not
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had banned what had previously been a standing practice of placing
tables on the campus to recruit students to participate in civil rights
demonstrations. In defiance of the ban, tables were manned to organize
political and social action. Eight students were suspended, and four hun-
dred students signed statements claiming to be guilty and asking to be dis-
ciplined. At a protest rally, a former student soliciting funds was arrested.
Several thousand students surrounded the police car in which the arrested
person had been placed and kept the car under siege for more than thirty
applied to private corporations has created a twilight zone that will be continually explored.
Educational academies are faced with the redesigning of the environment so as to meet the
individual needs and aspirations of their students. Faculty, students and administration con-
stitute a community and should be capable of living by a code that is fair to all of its mem-
bers and unique to its special requirements. Clark Byse, University and Due Process: A
Somewhat Different View, 54 AAUP BULL. 143 (1968). Justice Frankfurter, concurring in
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951), declared
that:
[Dlue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. Expressing as it does in its
ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for that feeling of just treatment which
has been evolved through centuries of Anglo-American constitutional history and
civilization, "due process" cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any
formula. Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and
more particularly between the individual and government, 'due process' is com-
pounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the
strength of the democratic faith which we profess. Due process is not a mechanical
instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate process of adjust-
ment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by those whom the Constitution
entrusted with the unfolding of the process ....
[T]he precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner
in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to the
procedure that was followed, the protection implicit in the office of the functionary
whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt complained of and good accom-
plished-these are some of the considerations that must enter into the judicial
judgment.
As Justice Frankfurter's statement makes clear, the process which the Constitution
requires is only that process which is "due" in light of the circumstances and interests of
the parties involved. Rather than requiring colleges and universities to wrangle over tech-
nicalities, the demand of due process is only that there be fair play. Underscoring Justice
Jackson's admonition, dissenting in Shaugnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
224-25 (1953), that due process of law is not for the sole benefit of an accused, it is the best
insurance against those blunders which leave lasting stains on a system of justice but which
are bound to occur on ex parte consideration. Teachers do not relinquish their first amend-
ment rights if they comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation
of public schools in which they work. Pickering v. Board of Ed., 88 S. Ct. 1731 (1968). In
Pickering, a dismissed teacher was ultimately successful in obtaining reinstatement. His letter
to a local newspaper in connection with a proposed tax increase, although critical of the
manner in which the Board of Education had handled past proposals to raise due revenue
for schools, was not a false statement, knowingly or recklessly made, and therefore did not
afford a basis for his dismissal. First amendment rights also apply to high school students.
Robinson v. Sacramento City Unified City School Dist., 245 Cal. App. 2d 278, 53 Cal. Rptr.
781 (3d Dist. 1966). Teachers' loyalty oaths have been held to be invalid for vagueness.
Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967). The ideas in action permeating colleges and uni-
versities throughout the world have produced revolutionary gurus like Che Guevara, Herbert
Marcuse, Jules Regis Debray, Frantz Fanon and Mao Tse-tung, and as a consequence the
insolated autonomy of academia is no longer accepted. This points up that riots without
reason and without compliance with peaceful assembly, do not deprive the university of its
expulsion rights. Undisciplined protest, arson, looting, and violence are matters for internal
discipline by the university. Amnesty as extorted by students cannot be tolerated, unless due
process becomes a three-way road, for the students, the teachers and the university.
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hours. Other students staged a sit-in in Sproul Hall, seeking to discuss the
suspension of the eight students, and an attempt to liberalize the regula-
tions was followed by imposition of further discipline on the leaders of the
Free Speech movement. Subsequently, a mass sit-in by one thousand stu-
dents was led in Sproul Hall, and the governor ordered the arrest of the
demonstrators. Approximately 819 persons were arrested, including 590
students, 89 teaching and research assistants, and 135 wives and husbands
of students and other nonstudents who were sympathizers. It took twelve
hours to remove the demonstrators, and the protests continued. The Uni-
versity administration was severely criticized. Ultimately the regents pro-
mulgated a new code for student activities which provided that "students
have the right of free expression and advocacy" and that "the time, place
and manner of exercising speech and political activity shall be subject to
regulations adopted by the chancellors of the respective campuses" which
"shall require orderly conduct, noninterference with university functions
or activities, and identification of sponsoring groups or individuals and shall
provide for one or more open discussion areas" with only registered stu-
dent organizations permitted to invite nonuniversity speakers after prior
notification of the chancellor who may designate a chairman for the meet-
ing. Individual students and registered organizations may take positions
on any public issue. Printed materials may be distributed only by uni-
versity personnel as directed by the chancellor. The regents further pro-
vided that a student "may not be disciplined for off-campus conduct unless
such conduct affects his suitability as a student." Political action, as such,
was not to be deemed to effect suitability. 8
The student revolt at the University of California was the first in-
stance of the use, on campus, of the tactic of nonviolent civil disobedience
as introduced into the United States by the civil rights movement. 4 Many
13. EMERSON & HABER, supra note 12. See generally Tigar, Symposium, Student Rights
and Campus Rules, 54 CALIF. L. RaV. 1 (1966). Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228, 235
(S.D. W. Va. 1968):
Power of president of state college to oversee, to formulate rules and regula-
tions, and to rule is necessary element in order to provide and promote education.
t . . [State college] officials have inherent general power to maintain order and to
exclude those who are detrimental to student body and institution's well-being, so
long as they exercise sound discretion and do not act arbitrarily or capriciously.
14. See generally Free Speech Movement and the Negro Revolution, NEWS AND LETTERS
PAMPHLET (1965).
The most striking aspect of the contemporary student movement is that it is world-
wide-a phenomenon of time rather than of place. In Asia, as in Europe and the Americas,
students are voicing their dissent from the established order-often carrying their protests
to violent extremes. The nature of their rebellion, however, is partly shaped by the differing
social and educational traditions with which they are confronted and by the degree of af-
fluence each area enjoys. In Italy the students challenged the archaic university system. In
Germany, the consumer society and the absence of open political contests were the targets.
In France, which occupies a middle position, the explosion was long delayed, and, for that
reason, was more violent when it came. But each revolt came in response to the massive
social and political changes that are reshaping the Western community. Today's students in
Europe, Latin America, or Japan are no longer acting as the avant-garde of broadly based
movements for modernization and social reform. Students are confronting the main problem
of how to pass from cultural and social protest to effective political action. The student
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of the participants in the revolt had been active in the civil rights move-
ment in the South and in the San Francisco Bay area.'5 The use of the
strike was adapted from the activities of organized labor. Subsequently,
the Berkeley experience was to be emulated on other campuses.
The students have protested the tendency toward alienation and
depersonalization of society. This has been reflected in the "multi-versity"
where students are directed by an IBM machine and an impersonal bu-
reaucracy. 6 To the members of the present student generation, the uni-
versities have become "factories to produce technicians rather than places
to live student lives.' 7 The tendency has been to measure education in
units: the number of lectures attended, the numbers of pages read or de-
voted to papers, thus mirroring the quantification of society as a whole.
At the same time, the student has become highly sensitive to moral issues.
Gunnar Myrdahl had perceived the American dilemma of contradiction
between stated generally accepted moral values and actual practice, such
as the professed belief in equality as contrasted with prevailing racial
inequality. 8 A similar dilemma exists in international relations in the
stated values for respect of human life, national self-determination and
human brotherhood as contrasted with the war in Viet Nam. Students,
viewing society from the vantage point of youth, are most sensitive to
these contradictions and have been the vanguard for setting society right.'9
revolt signals the birth of new conflicts, the first act in the drama of putting the new com-
puterized industrial state on trial. While they continue to make appeals to the working
class, it is not agitation among the workers that triggers the rebellions. The historic events
that galvanize the students to action are no longer solely domestic. It is the issue of Viet Nam
and the symbolism of Che Guevara that inspire their deepest loyalty. In the main, students
remain rebels without alliances, notwithstanding the failure of institutions to recognize that
college students represent a new kind of adolescence requiring a special kind of response. The
moral dilemma of affluent America over the plight of the negro is, of course, the most de-
cisive force in society. The guilt and grief with which white America mourned the death of
Martin Luther King, Jr. is illustrative of the subterranean feeling present before his death. It
is no accident that the student protest derived from the civil rights movement. When that
movement ceased to welcome white students to the protest activities, this was used to sublimate
the guilt of more than three hundred years of injustice. Militant and nonviolent students
each can bring an institution of higher learning to a grinding halt. However, they are faced
with two imperatives, (1) "what are the principal limits of the student protests," and (2)
"which of the students' complaints are legitimate ones that necessitate changes in the pro-
cesses of higher education and in the power structure of universities." Hence, Habeas Scho-
lastica and the Rule of Law. [Author's comment.]
15. Id.
16. Id. at 38-40; C. KERR, THE UsES OF THE UNIVERSITY (1963).
17. Free Speech Movement and the Negro Revolution, supra note 14, at 19. The Uni-
versity has also been described as the "Marketversity." BILLINGTON, THE HUMANITIES HEART-
BEAT HAS FAILED LIFE 32-35 (1968) [hereinafter cited as BILLINGTONI.
18. See generally G. MYRDAHL, THE AmERIcAN DILEmmA (1944).
19. See generally KENISTEN, THE YOUNG RADICALS (1968); C. Commager, The Violent,
Idealistic World of Student Revolt, CONG. REc. S6725 (daily ed. June 3, 1968) [hereinafter
cited as Commager].
N. Cousins, The Crusade for Law and Order, SATURDAY REv., July 6, 1968, at 16:
[Ilt is ironic that a nation born out of protest should be putting such high pri-
ority on subduing protest rather than scrutinizing it and seeking to meet it in the
only basic way it can be met. Law in a free society is much more than an army
of heavily armed policemen wading into a crowd; law is first of all a system of
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Students have, therefore, participated in efforts to rectify social evils
by engaging in efforts to promote the rights of Negroes and the under-
privileged and in opposing the war in Viet Nam. Since the student is most
intimately tied with his immediate environment (i.e., the university), he
has become especially concerned with rectifying the problems of the
campus. The students who are in the forefront of these protests comprise
a small minority of the student population. The Students for a Demo-
cratic Society, the most vocal student protest group, has a membership
of only five thousand; and the protesters on a campus may comprise only
1 to 51% of the student body on the average campus.2" However, in the
writer's opinion, the protesting groups comprise the most intelligent stu-
dents who are scholastically of the highest rank. They are well organized
and capable of attracting support beyond their numbers. Though there
have been the predictable charges of Communist Party infiltration,2' these
students do not appear to be concerned with such issues. They are opposed
to regimentation and the system as such, manifesting anarchist or de-
centralist tendencies. 22
The student at the university feels himself to be powerless in his re-
lationship to an all-powerful administration. Though he may hear preach-
ments about "government by the people" and "democratic rule," he is
justice, political and social, designed primarily to keep people from being pushed
around by other people or by the state itself, and to enable people to live fuller and
freer lives.
The best way to make law work is to make justice operational....
[A] distinction must be made between the many students who are demonstrat-
ing for increased participation in the decisions that affect their lives, and the few
students who are exploiting this underlying situation for their own avowed destruc-
tive ends. (It is unfortunate that Columbia University, where relations broke down,
should dominate the headlines, while almost no attention is being paid to campuses
such as American University, in Washington, D.C., where student protest has been
imaginatively and responsibly met and where a pattern of strong student-faculty-
administration cooperation is being worked out.)
[Tihe attack on violence requires not just superior counter-violence but a
spirited and morally imaginative upgrading of our entire way of life.
John Fischer [in an editorial in HARPER'S MAGAZINE, August 1968] looses a blast against
college faculties which very nearly brings him on the side of the student upheavalists. Mar-
shalling statistics and borrowing from a new study by writer Christopher Jencks and Harvard
social scientist David Riesman, Fischer charges that the professors have gone so far down
the road toward affluence with their fat salaries and multifarious moonlighting activities
that the teaching job is fobbed off onto graduate students just an academic jump ahead of
the undergraduates.
Fischer's research has convinced him that the student crowds who sit-in or riot are by
no means composed chiefly of hippie hell-raisers. He believes the average crowd would assay
a high content of serious, intelligent, but cynical undergraduates voicing their displeasure
with a faculty and administration that have let them down miserably.
But a greater irony is the fact that while the scientific and technological revolution has
involved the world more and more deeply in cosmic problems threatening to annihilate the
race, the academic world is doing less and less to provide the basic human wisdom that
must underlie the answers. Perhaps the undergraduate plea for a greater student voice in
university affairs has more point than most of us supposed. What Bugs the Students, edi-
torial, Chicago Daily News, August 19, 1968, at 14, cols. 1 and 2.
20. NEwSWEEK, supra note 1.
21. Comments by Representative Willis, CONG. REc. H2063 (daily ed., March 19, 1968).
22. Comments by Joseph C. Harsh, Christian Science Monitor, March 31, 1968, at 1;
De Zutter, SDS: Thunder from the Campus, Chicago Daily News, June 4, 1968, at 3.
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confronted with an authority making his decisions and compelling him to
obey. He becomes enmeshed in a dehumanized bureaucratized behemoth.
To petition or simply express grievances is merely greeted with talk and
inaction. The student must, therefore, act through confrontation, which
can only be achieved by acts of civil disobedience. Such a course is in ac-
cord with the American tradition of disobeying what has been regarded
as illegitimate authority. Such disobedience appears, according to this tra-
dition, to be justified when authority condones or promotes what is im-
moral.23
For example, the war in Viet Nam deeply offends the moral sensi-
bilities of these students. Therefore, aware of possible punitive reprisals,
it is permissible to disobey the draft laws. 24 Similarly, arbitrary bureauc-
ratized authority by a university administration may be justified by civil
disobedience. Where administrative action offends the students' con-
sciences, as in ignoring the rights of negroes or in cooperating with the
military-industrial complex in furthering the war in Viet Nam, civil dis-
obedience becomes justified to them. But fundamentally, the issue is the
question of student power, the right of the student to participate in the
decision-making process, i.e., participatory democracy. Among black stu-
dents, student power has become entwined with black power as these
students seek to have a voice to determine policies affecting negroes. Gen-
erally, the techniques of civil disobedience employed have been nonvio-
lent, such as student boycotts, the violation of regulations and sit-ins
which have, on occasion, resulted in the occupation of student buildings.
These tactics may not necessarily be an invitation to lawlessness or the
general breakdown of the legal order when undertaken by persons who
are committed generally to legal obedience and undertake acts of civil
disobedience openly only after careful investigation of one's conscience.25
However, some student groups appear to have acted only to achieve power
for their own sake and do not appear motivated by conscience and prin-
ciples of nonviolence.28
The student protests stem from a lack of administration and faculty
dialogue both in and out of the classrooms as the universities have be-
come too compartmentalized. The student feels spiritually starved. As
historian James Billington observed in commenting on student mood,
[T]hey protest against the failing of the arid classroom to pro-
vide the humanizing education that the college catalogue had
promised. In their often clumsy way, they are trying to bridge
the rhetoric gap-but they see no hands extended from the other
side.
23. See generally Sibley, Direct Action and the Struggle for Integration, 16 HASTINGS
L.J. 285 (1965).
24. KENISTON, THE YOUNG RADICALS (1968).
25. See generally C. Cohen, Symposium, Civil Disobedience and the Law, 21 RUTGERS
L. Rv. 1 (1966).
26. Comments by Carl Rowan in Washington Evening Star, May 15, 1968, and May
31, 1968, printed in CoNG. RFe. S6736 (daily ed., June 3, 1968).
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Thus, the turned-out student generation has joined (or
merely identified with) the two heavily publicized young peoples'
revolts of the mid-sixties: the hippies, with their passionate be-
lief in instant esthetics and salvation-through hallucination; and
the New Left, with its equally passionate commitment to instant
morality and salvation-through confrontation. Both groups are
purer than their detractors contend. They generate an authentic
feeling of human community; and they are trying to put esthetic
and moral questions back into the machine age.27
Student confrontations with university establishments have prolifer-
ated throughout the nation. A list of grievances would be submitted to
the university officials and the response would be discussion. Sometimes
the university would grant some demands and the students would de-
mand more or the university would delay and be unresponsive. The result
would be confrontation. 28 At Stanford, a student sit-in resulted in the
granting to students of a greater voice in the making of university policy. 29
Black students at Northwestern staged a sit-in at the Administration
Building and obtained an agreement from the administration acceding to
some student demands involving increased admission of black students,
provisions for black student housing and for a place for black students
to congregate, and the offering of courses in Negro history." Though oppo-
sition was expressed by the Board of Trustees to the tactics the students
used, the administration action was ratified." At Roosevelt University
student protest arose with regard to a faculty-administration controversy
when the President refused to approve the permanent appointment of
History Professor Staughton Lynd, who, in 1965, had traveled to North
Viet Nam in defiance of a State Department travel ban. The History
Department had unanimously recommended his appointment, but the
President refused on grounds of personality and ad hominem. The stu-
dents staged sit-ins at the President's office; and when they refused to
leave when the offices closed for the day, they were arrested for trespassing
and suspended. Approximately seventy students were thus arrested and
suspended until the demonstrations were finally terminated.82
Issues causing student confrontations with the administration vary.
At Wisconsin, students have staged demonstrations to protest the policy
of the trustees in investing funds in Chase Manhattan Bank stock because
of its dealings with the Union of South Africa.3" At Duke University,
27. BILLINGTON, supra note 17. Commager, supra note 19 states,
At its best student revolt in America is characterized by idealism, at its worst by
bad manners and violence and almost everywhere by an exasperating combination
of logic and irrationality. This is because it is directed not so much against academic
as against public grievances, not against ostentatious injustices and oppression as
against authority, traditionalism and complacency.
28. De Zutter, War on Campus-Who and Why, Chicago Daily News, May 16, 1968, at 3.
29. Chicago Daily News, May 2, 1968, at 5.
30. Chicago's American, May 10, 1968, at 1.
31. Chicago Daily News, May 15, 1968, at 6.
32. Chicago Sun-Times, May 9, 1968, at 22. Chicago Tribune, May 10, 1968, at 1.
33. The Chicago Maroon, May 21, 1968, at 2.
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fifteen hundred students sat in rows for days on the school's main quad-
rangle in an attempt to force the trustees to pay nonacademic employees
more than the going rate of $1.15 an hour. Other students boycotted
classes and cafeterias until finally the divinity school faculty unanimously
voted to divert their annual raises into the pay envelopes of campus maids
and policemen.34 Boston University's 125 negro students took over the
Administration Building until the President agreed to recruit more black
students and start black studies. 5 Five hundred students and faculty sat
in the Administration Building at Colgate for almost five days until school
officials promised to reform the fraternities' selective and discriminatory
"black ball" rushing system.36 Fifty Temple University students staged
an overnight "sleep-in," departing under court order as they demanded
greater student power.
3 7
The rebellion which has attracted the greatest attention and has
erupted into violence is the student revolt at Columbia. Within a five-day
period, a group of two hundred students physically seized control of five
major university buildings, occupied and vandalized the office of Columbia
President Grayson Kirk, held the Dean of the College prisoner for twenty-
four hours, and brought classroom instruction to a halt. The students de-
stroyed university property and stole records. The revolt was sparked
by a proposal to build a new gym in adjacent Morningside Park, an open-
space area abutting a negro neighborhood which the students believed
should be used for the recreation of the surrounding residents and accused
the administration of ignoring the needs of these residents; by the school's
receiving of research grants and cooperation with the Pentagon-affiliated
Institute of Defense Analysis; and by the refusal of the school to grant
amnesty to students who had been previously engaged in demonstrations.
The University's Hamilton Hall was first seized and occupied by a group
of negro and white students, but subsequently the black students ejected
the white and nonstudents from the black community who had joined their
demonstration. The white students then occupied Low Library while a
third group seized Avery and Fayerweather Halls. The Low Library group
was the most militant, led by Mark Rudd, an advocate of total revolu-
tion. For almost a week the revolt was a standoff as the administration
sought to negotiate with the rebellious students; however, its refusal to
grant total amnesty resulted in stalemate. The students became well
organized, communicating with walkie-talkies and setting up medical,
food and clean-up committees. The administration, at New York City
Mayor Lindsay's prodding, yielded with regard to the gymnasium by
stopping construction at least temporarily and indicated it would sever
34. NEWSWEE, supra note 1. Students at Florida State University held a 10-day sleep-
in in front of the administration building to promote changes on campus speaker policies.
New York Times, May 17, 1968, at 40, col. 2.
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its ties with the Institute for Defense Analysis. The faculty emerged as
the mediator, particularly the law professors. Finally, however, the ad-
ministration requested the police to clear the students from the buildings;
and instances of brutality ensued as students were clubbed as well as some
bystanders, resulting in the arrest of 696 students and 96 injuries. The
result was that a large portion of the student body, which had previously
been unsympathetic, supported the student position. The administration
found it could not return to normal class schedules as a strike developed,
and permitted students to have the option of receiving a passing or failing
grade on their work based upon academic performance up to the time of
the demonstrations or of receiving no credits. The administration also
agreed to appoint a fact-finding committee, chaired by former Solicitor
General Archibald Cox and comprised of prominent jurists and academi-
cians, to inquire into the demonstrations and the allegations of police
brutality." Demonstrations continued as 100 students were arrested when
police ended a nine-hour sit-in at a Morningside Heights tenement to pro-
test Columbia's building program. This particular protest was undertaken
by community residents with the students assisting. The students have
demanded an entire restructuring of the university with greater student-
faculty participation in decisions. Approximately one month after the
original demonstrations several lawyers, 20 parents and approximately
200 students entered Hamilton Hall to protest the disciplining of students,
while several hundred other students milled outside. A thousand policemen
entered the campus swinging night sticks, arresting 153 persons and 60
were injured, including 10 policemen. 9
Student groups differ as to the type of reforms to be sought at Colum-
bia. Mark Rudd and the Students for Democratic Society appeared to
assume an extreme position of student sovereignty, while moderate stu-
dents and possibly the administration are now willing to grant students
and faculty a voice in administrative decision-making. The President of
the Student Council charged that Columbia President Grayson Kirk had
suppressed a report recommending a greater role for faculty members
and students in Columbia's disciplinary proceedings.4" A joint Committee
on Disciplinary Affairs comprised of seven teachers, seven faculty mem-
bers and three administrators recommended that its determinations on
discipline of demonstrators be final, that some students be placed on pro-
bation, that those committing vandalism or theft be suspended, and
that trespassing charges be dropped. President Kirk, however, at first
announced he would not be bound by the Committee's recommendations
but subsequently indicated his confidence in it and that, if he disagreed,
he would be willing to submit the matter to a distinguished alumnus re-
38. Chicago Daily News, May 22, 1968, at 1, col. 4; New York Post, May 18, 1968, at 1.
39. New York Times, May 6, 1968, at 1, col. 7 (late city ed.). Accounts of the Columbia
Revolt are found in Mutiny at a Great University, LIFE, May 10, 1968, at 36; The Siege of
Columbia, RAMPARTS MAG., June 15, 1968, at 27. NEWSWEEx, supra note 1.
40. New York Times, May 10, 1968, at 1, col. 4 (late city ed.).
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spected by all.' The New York Times indicated that the University was
seeking a way to avoid prosecutions for trespassing. 2
A majority of the Law School faculty issued a statement declaring
"confidence in the orderly processes of change in American universities
as well as in the larger society in which universities are a part." The
statement recognized that organized protest is allowable and protected
by the Constitution against interference by public agencies and is sanc-
tioned within independent universities "by long practice and deep intel-
lectual conviction of its worth;" but there are limits to such organized
protests which are overstepped "when protesters seize buildings or
physically restrain the freedom of personal movement in order to manifest
dissatisfaction." The statement asserts,
We do not assert that every act of "civil disobedience" is
reprehensible. One way to challenge the validity of a statute is
to ignore its commands, undergo arrest and prosecution, and then
argue that the law is unconstitutional.
We recognize, too, that in rare instances persons whose
voices might otherwise not be heard at all may engage in con-
certed violation of an admittedly constitutional law in order to
proclaim their disapproval of it. In that situation, the violators
are prepared to pay the penalty for their disobedience, hoping
thus to dramatize opposition to the operative policies. Having in
mind the difficulties sometimes experienced in drawing attention
to public issues and to dissenting views, we cannot condemn this
form of civil disobedience in every conceivable circumstance.
The Columbia episodes at the outset did not involve civil
disobedience, but an effort to impose opinions by force. Without
ascertaining whether other students shared their thoughts about
academic and social issues, a relatively small group of students
sought to immobilize the University until their conceptions of
sound policy were adopted. Tactics like these have nothing in
common with principled opposition or with democratic processes.
They represented attempted intimidation.,
The force of reason rather than the force of massed bodies
must be the reliance of those who wish to influence a community
guided by intelligence, as is Columbia. Disrupting institutional
proceedings is an impermissible substitute for rational persua-
sion. Using muscle instead of minds to express dissent has no
place in the academic setting.
We are confident that American students will themselves
recognize the unwisdom of attempting to gain goals by illegal
force. Violence begets violence. It beclouds rather than illumines
issues. No problem that confronts Columbia or other American
universities is beyond the capabilities of men who use the tools
education has given them.
41. Id., May 11, 1968, at 1, col. 3.
42. Id.
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The statement particularly condemned the examination of the President's
personnel correspondence files and removing of letters which were pub-
licized as a flouting of the constitutional and legal right to privacy and
as "a violation of basic decency." The statement asserts that the Uni-
versity "did not act unreasonably" when it called for police assistance in
clearing the campus but deplores acts of police brutality by policemen
who ignored their orders and thereby created campus indignation. As to
student power, the statement welcomes an inquiry into mechanisms for
expressing and considering relevant student views and that student opin-
ion should be made known. Efforts to improve disciplinary procedures
are supported with the underlying premise of due process with "fair pro-
cedure and reasoned judgment ... its operative elements." Reinforcement
of existing safeguards against mistaken decisions is desirable, though
abusiveness was not characteristic of past disciplinary actions despite the
absence of elaborate procedures.4"
Though there were charges that the protests at Columbia were
planned in October, ten months in advance, Mark Rudd denied such
allegations, while admitting that he had drawn up a proposal which was
subsequently scrapped. 4" At this writing, however, the Columbia protest
remains unresolved, and the fact-finding committee has yet to hold hear-
ings and issue its report.
A parallel exists between protests in the United States and in other
countries. Extremist students leading the protests appear to be guided
by the same intellectual heroes: Ch6 Guevara, Father Torres, Herbert
Marcuse, Jules Regis Debray, Frantz Fanon, and Mao Tse-tung. How-
ever, the nonviolence of most of the American protests suggests the in-
fluence of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. Students at different uni-
versities learn from each other. The students at the Sorbonne who under-
take demonstrations in France are familiar with the tactics of the pro-
testers at Columbia.45
The developments on the college campuses might be of prime concern
to society at large. Educational institutions play a major role in American
life. As one writer observes,
It may be that the business of America is no longer busi-
ness, but education. Nearly 30 per cent of the physical capital of
the nation is currently tied up not in industrial plant and equip-
ment but in schools and educational materials. About 55 million
persons, one-fourth of our total population, are at present full
time students. Teachers are now by far the largest occupational
group in the country.
And everybody is in the act. The military branches do more
teaching than fighting; the Defense Department is said to spend
more on education beyond high school than the 50 state govern-
43. Id., May 17, 1968, at 41, col. 2.
44. Id., May 13, 1968, at 46, col. 1.
45. NEwswEEK, supra note 1.
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ments combined. Firms like General Electric and I.B.M. spend
more on training and education than all but the largest univer-
sities. America is on its way to becoming a knowledge state....
Clearly, the conditions for the pursuit of knowledge and the health of the
academic community is a national problem.47
Within this context the campus unrest cannot be lightly ignored.
Though it is in part a result of youthful exuberance, a situation which has
existed in other historical periods as well,48 the student protesters have a
message to convey. Their demonstrations point to the need for expanding
academic freedom, the cornerstone for the functioning of the knowledge
state. A legal forum must be substituted for resort to demonstrations. Such
a solution is proposed in adopting the institution of an academic Ombuds-
man as a protector of academic due process for both students and faculty.
An examination will first be made of the development of the concept of
academic freedom in the United States and of its protection under law.
A proposal will then be presented suggesting institutional means for the
nurturing and protection of academic freedom.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIc FREEDOM
The roots of academic freedom are to be found in the academies of
Socrates and Plato in Ancient Greece and in the autonomous corporate
universities of the Middle Ages.49 Internal matters of universities were in
the hands of those immediately connected with learning, with each faculty
electing its own head and holding its own assemblies. Medieval students
were reported to have been young and riotous, regularly making enemies
among the townspeople, who resented their privileges and licentiousness."0
However, the first truly free university in the modern sense was the Uni-
versity of Leiden, founded in 1575, where the scholar could free himself
from the limits of the confessional university.5
In the United States the first colleges were congregational institu-
tions, and free inquiry first developed with the toleration of divergent
12religious views. However, the true impetus for academic freedom came
with the growth of Darwinism and scientific skepticism.5" Of particular
influence were the German universities and the concept of Lernfreiheit and
Lehrfreiheit. By Lernfreiheit was meant the absence of administrative
coercions in the learning situation so that German students were free to
move from university to university and to select courses. Lehrjreiheit
46. Keller, Book Review, Chicago Tribune Book World, May 19, 1968, at 1.
47. Weller, Student Revolt, How It Grew, Chicago Daily News, May 25, 1968, at 14.
48. TIME, May 3, 1968, at 24.
49. Commager, supra note 19. See generally JENCxS & RiSEmAN, THE ACADEMIC REvo-
LUTION (1968).
50. R. HOFSTADER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE
UNITED STATES 3 (1955) [hereinafter cited as HOFSTADER & METZOER].
51. Id. at 71.
52. Id. at 236-37.
53. Id. at 278.
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referred to freedom to engage in learning and research and to be free
from administrative regulation within the teaching situation."4 Americans
who studied at German universities brought these concepts of academic
freedom to the United States and adapted them to the American context,
focusing mostly on Lehrjreiheit, the rights of professors, rather than the
rights of students as embodied in Lernfreiheit. As the graduate schools
were established and patterned after the German universities, the prin-
ciple of academic freedom took root. In contrast to Germany, where the
principle of academic freedom was premised on philosophical speculation,
in America, academic freedom became identified with the need of scien-
tific investigation and empiricism.55 Truth was to be derived from scientific
investigation, with norms of neutrality and competence. Facts were to be
the arbiters between competing notions of truth. The American norms
were more permissive than the German in permitting freedom of utter-
ances for professors outside the college community, with the professor
having the right to express an opinion outside his competence on extra-
mural subjects. Thus, the concepts of free speech and civil liberties be-
came incorporated into the concept of academic freedom. The principles
of academic freedom were first formulated in 1915 by the American Asso-
ciation of Universitv Professors.5" In 1940, these principles were refor-
mulated by the AAUP in conjunction with the American Association of
Universities comprised of college presidents, which asserted that the com-
mon good depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition
and that academic freedom is essential to these purposes. "Freedom in
research is fundamental to the advancement of truth" and "academic free-
dom in its teaching aspect is fundamental for the protection of the rights
of the teacher in teaching and of the student to freedom in learning.
' 1 7
The statement regards academic tenure as essential to academic free-
dom. With regard to academic freedom, the teacher is entitled to full
freedom in research and in the publication of the results; to freedom in
the classroom in discussing his subject, but he "should be careful not to
introduce into his teaching controversial matter which has no relation to
his subject;" and that when he speaks or writes as a citizen he should be
free from institutional censorship or discipline, but his special position in
the community imposes special obligation in that the public may judge his
profession and institution by his utterances so that "he should at all times
be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for
the opinion of others, and should make every effort to indicate that he is
not an institutional spokesman." Regarding academic tenure, the state-
ment asserts the principles that after the end of a probationary period
teachers or investigators would have permanent or continuous tenure, and
54. Id. at 385-89.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 471.
57. T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CivIm RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 915-17 (1967) [hereinafter cited as EMERSON, HABER & DoRs-..
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services should not be terminated except for adequate cause, retirement
for age, or under extraordinary circumstances because of financial exi-
gencies. As acceptable academic practice, the statement provides that the
precise terms and conditions of every appointment should be stated in
writing. The probationary period should not exceed seven years during
which a teacher should have the same academic freedom as other faculty
members. Termination for cause of a continuous appointment or dismissal
for cause of a teacher before the expiration of a term appointment should,
if possible, be considered by both a faculty committee and the governing
board of the institution and where the facts are in dispute the accused
teacher should be informed in writing before the hearing of the charges
against him and should have the opportunity to be heard in his own de-
fense with assistance of a counsel or adviser and a full stenographic
record should be kept.
The principle of academic freedom was challenged by the charges
made by some during the 1950's regarding alleged Communist Party asso-
ciations of college professors and by the concern of many that a teacher
subject to the discipline of the Communist Party was not capable of en-
gaging in free inquiry. The AAUP adopted a statement asserting "that
alarming consequences have resulted from the security procedures and
the political tensions of the past few years" which present serious dangers
to the national welfare and security itself in impairing the supply of quali-
fied scientists, engineers and foreign service officers and by the suffering
inflicted through unwarranted and crudely conducted investigations and
dismissals, thereby deterring many young people from seeking government
careers. 8 The statement further asserted that "when the instances of aca-
demic dismissals and the unfortunate policies they exemplify are cast
against the stormy background of popular agitation, governmental in-
vestigation, and hostile legislation, it is not surprising that scholarship has
lost ground and that we are threatened with a shortage of qualified
teachers. . . ." The AAUP stated that "the need for academic freedom
is greater, far greater, than ever before." The statement recognizes the
need for the application of safeguards to colleges and universities against
the misuses of specially classified information necessary for military secu-
rity, to be applied only to the persons having access to the information.
The AAUP also recognized the need for vigilance against the subversion
of the educational process and stated,
The academic community has a duty to defend society and
itself from subversion of the educational process by dishonest
tactics, including political conspiracies to deceive students and
lead them unwittingly into acceptance of dogmas or false causes.
Any member of the academic profession who has given reason-
able evidence that he uses such tactics should be proceeded
against forthwith, and should be expelled from his position if his
58. Id. at 1009-14.
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guilt is established by rational procedure. Instances of the use
of such tactics in the past by secret Communist groups in a few
institutions seem to have occurred and vigilance against their
occurrence in the future is clearly required. 9
But the statement contends that nothing in the record of college and uni-
versity teachers as a group justifies the imputation to them of tendencies
toward disloyalty. Furthermore, the practice of subjecting them to special
tests is deplored and the Association opposes the imposition of disclaimer
oaths, the investigations of individuals against whom there is no reason-
able suspicion of illegal or unprofessional conduct or of an intent to engage
in such conduct and of legislation imposing upon supervisory officials the
duty to certify that members of the staff are free of subversive taint.
Referring to the 1940 statement, the AAUP asserted,
Implicit in that Statement is the proposition ... that a faculty
member's professional fitness to continue in his position, con-
sidered in the light of other relevant factors, is the question to be
determined when his status as a teacher is challenged. No rule
demanding removal for a specific reason not clearly determina-
tive of professional fitness can validly be implemented by an in-
stitution unless the rule is imposed by law or made necessary by
the institution's particularly religious coloration. Any rule which
bases dismissal upon the mere fact of exercise of constitutional
rights violates the principle of both academic freedom and aca-
demic tenure. By eliminating a decision by a faculty member's
peers, it may also deny due process. This principle governs the
question of dismissal for avowed past or present membership in
the Communist Party taken by itself. Removal can be justified
only on the ground, established by evidence, of unfitness to teach
because of incompetence, lack of scholarly objectivity or in-
tegrity, serious misuse of the classroom or of academic prestige,
gross personal misconduct, or conscious participation in conspir-
acy against the government. The same principle applies, a for-
tiori, to alleged involvement in Communist-inspired activities
or views, and to refusal to take a trustee imposed disclaimer
oath.60
Thus, the invocation of the fifth amendment by a faculty member
"cannot be in itself a sufficient ground for removing him," as the exercise
of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination does not com-
monly justify an inference of guilt. Hence, "invocation of the fifth amend-
ment is to be weighted with an individual's other actions in passing
judgment on him" and the same may be said regarding refusals to testify
on other grounds, such as the fifth amendment right of silence. However,
the statement provides that if a faculty member invokes the fifth amend-
ment, the institution should make a preliminary inquiry according with
59. Id. at 1010.
60. Id. at 1011.
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procedural due process with judgment by his peers. The AAUP took the
position that the fact that a faculty member has refused to disclose infor-
mation to his own institution is relevant regarding his fitness to teach, but
not decisive.
If the refusal appears to be based upon evasiveness and a desire
to withhold evidence of illegal conduct which would disqualify
him as a member of the faculty, the refusal would be a weighty
adverse factor. On the other hand, a refusal to answer questions
which arises from a sincere belief that a teacher is entitled to
withhold even from his own institution his political and social
views should be accorded respect and should be weighed with
other factors in the determination of his fitness to teach. Never-
theless, members of the teaching profession should recognize that
sincerity cannot be judged objectively and that a college or uni-
versity is entitled to know the facts with which it must deal. This
is especially true when a faculty member's activities, whether or
not they are blameworthy, have resulted in publicity hurtful to
his institution. Accordingly, in any proper inquiry by his insti-
tution, it is the duty of a faculty member to disclose facts con-
cerning himself that are of legitimate concern to the institution,
namely, those that relate to his fitness as a teacher .... 61
Previously, the Association of American Universities had issued a
statement affirming the need for free inquiry and the expression of ideas
which may not be curbed so that the scholar is free to challenge orthodox
views. However, a line is asserted to exist between "freedom" and "privi-
lege" that "when the speech, writing or other actions of a member of
a faculty exceed lawful limits, he is subject to the same penalties as other
persons" and "in addition, he may lose his university status.16 2 Associa-
tion with a university implies adherence to standards with endorsement
of capability and integrity so that a faculty member "by ill-advised, though
not illegal, public acts or utterances ... may do serious harm to his pro-
fession, his university, to education, and to the general welfare" so that
"he has a heavy responsibility to weigh the validity of his opinions and
the manner in which they are expressed." The statement asserts that the
professor owes complete candor and perfect integrity to his colleagues and
the general public, "precluding any kind of clandestine or conspiratorial
activities."
If he is called upon to answer for his convictions it is his duty as
a citizen to speak out. It is even more definitely his duty as a
professor. Refusal to do so, on whatever legal grounds, cannot
fail to reflect upon a profession that claims for itself the fullest
freedom to speak and the maximum protection of that freedom
available in our society. In this respect, invocation of the Fifth
Amendment places upon a professor a heavy burden of proof of
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1003-08.
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his fitness to hold a teaching position and lays upon his university
an obligation to re-examine his qualification for membership in
its society. 8
Since faculties exercise authority in internal affairs, "they must accept
their share of responsibility for the discipline of those who fall short in
the discharge of their academic trust." Because universities enjoy public
benefits, they carry with them public obligations of direct concern to the
faculties and the governing boards. Legislative bodies may scrutinize these
benefits and privileges, and "it is clearly the duty of universities and their
members to cooperate in official inquiries directed to those ends." "When
the powers of legislative inquiry are abused, the remedy does not lie in
noncooperation or defiance; it is to be sought through the normal chan-
nels of informed public opinion." The statement then condemns Russian
Communism, contending that under its principles no scholar could ad-
equately disseminate knowledge or pursue investigations in the effort to
make further progress toward truth.
Appointment to a university position and retention after
appointment require not only professional competence but in-
volve the affirmative obligation of being diligent and loyal in
citizenship. Above all, a scholar must have integrity and inde-
pendence. This renders impossible adherence to such a regime as
that of Russia and its satellites. No person who accepts or advo-
cates such principles and methods has any place in a university.
Since present membership in the Communist Party requires the
acceptance of these principles and methods, such membership
extinguishes the right to a university position. Moreover, if an
instructor follows communistic practice by becoming a pro-
pagandist for one opinion, adopting a "party line," silencing
criticism or impairing freedom of thought and expression in his
classroom, he forgeits not only all university support but his right
to membership in the university. 4
The statement further asserts that the universities should cooperate
with law enforcement officials whose duty requires them to prosecute
those charged with offenses, but their innocence is to be presumed until
convicted under due process. However, unless a faculty member violates
a law, his discipline or discharge is a university responsibility and should
not be assumed by political authorities. "Discipline on the basis of irre-
sponsible accusations or suspicion can never be condoned," and "the uni-
versity is competent to establish a tribunal to determine the facts and
fairly judge the nature and degree of any trespass upon academic integ-
rity. . . ." The professor should not be subject to any special discrimina-
tion so that "universities are bound to deprecate special loyalty tests
which are applied to their faculties but to which others are not sub-
jected ... .'
63. Id. at 1007.
64. Id. at 1008.
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However, the AAUP statement,6 5 after citing various cases, was
critical of the manner in which academic institutions have been subject to
"the irresponsible push and pull of contemporary controversies." It urged
that "American colleges and universities return to a full scale acceptance
of intellectual controversy based on a catholicity of viewpoint, for the
sake of national strength as well as for academic reasons. Noting that
"simple membership in the [Communist] Party has not yet been clearly
defined as illegal, . . . the influence of the academic community should,
we think, be directed against the proscription of membership in a move-
ment which needs to be kept in view rather than driven underground."
Referring to the Association of American Universities statement with re-
gard to invocation of the fifth amendment, the AAUP statement contends,
[T]here is a popular prejudice against informers as such,
but there is also reason to sympathize with a person who declines
to act in the ruin of others who, in his judgment, do not deserve
such a fate. The use of the Fifth Amendment as a basis for
silence in such situations may not be morally or academically
blameworthy, although it might be legally indefensible....
The policy of placing "a heavy burden of proof" on a
teacher who has invoked the Fifth Amendment must be consid-
ered in relation to the constitutional protection that the Amend-
ment is designed to secure. This report [of the AAUP] has
already expressed a belief in the duty of a faculty member to be
open and truthful with his associates if he has invoked the Fifth
Amendment and is for this reason questioned; but it does not
follow that it is wise or right to place his professional survival in
jeopardy by demanding that he not only talk freely but also re-
fute unspecified inferences drawn by his accusers from his
refusal to testify. The adoption of such a policy tends to substi-
tute economic punishment for the criminal punishment against
which the amendment is designed to guard; and it impairs in
direct proportion the constitutional guaranty. The variety of
reasons which have induced witnesses to invoke the Fifth
Amendment, moreover, renders the policy of attaching prima
facie blameworthiness to their conduct thoroughly unreal-
istic .... 66
Clearly, the AAUP statement regarding academic freedom takes the
position that mere membership in the Communist Party should not in
itself preclude faculty status, while the statement of the American As-
sociation of Universities would appear to preclude Party members. While
the AAUP position is more tolerant to professors who invoke the fifth
amendment, the American Association of Universities would impose a
"heavy burden of proof" upon such a professor. These differences indicate
that, while there is general acceptance to the principles of academic free-.
65. Note 47, supra.
66. HOFSTADER & METZGER, supra note 50, at 1014.
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dom, disagreement persists as to its application. A debate has raged as to
whether Communist Party members should be allowed to teach. 7 Where
professors were dismissed for prior Communist Party membership, as at
the University of Washington,68 there appeared to be no consideration of
teaching competence. A similar attitude prevailed regarding dismissal for
invoking the fifth amendment. Where professors were not dismissed, they
were not reappointed. 9 There have also been instances where professors
were dismissed or denied reappointment for holding or expressing opinions
on public issues which deviated from certain pressure groups, such as
opposition to the House Un-American Activities Committee or the film,
Operation A bolition.7"
This writer submits that a professor's past or present political as-
sociations or philosophy should not in itself be a basis for determining
faculty status. The only criteria should be his competence as a teacher
or researcher. Mere membership in the Communist Party should not be
the deciding factor. If, however, evidence is presented, in accord with
due process, which establishes that the faculty member is or has engaged
in activities involving the conspiracy or promotion of violent revolution
or other acts which constitute a violation of a statute, or if his political
commitment has in fact impaired his competency in that he has ceased to
adhere to standards of scholarship and objectivity, grounds would be
established for terminating his faculty status.
A university, in its quest for truth, must encourage the availability
of what the AAUP statement rightly terms, a catholicity of views. A uni-
versity can be truly said to have academic freedom if it adheres to the
Socratic principle that only the examined life is worth living, that man
is ennobled by understanding. Only then can it be said that its students
are being educated and that it has become a fountainhead of knowledge.
In such a climate all opinions and political philosophies must be encour-
aged to flourish. Only when truths are challenged and refuted can they be
said to flourish. As John Stuart Mill observed, "Complete liberty of con-
tradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which justifies
us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms
can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being
right."' Mill further observed that "the whole strength and value of human
judgment... , depending on the one property, that it can be set right when
it is wrong, reliance can be placed on it only when the means of setting
it right are kept constantly at hand.""2 From this it follows that a university
must encourage the flourishing of all philosophies, no matter how heretical.
67. Id. at 1015-16.
68. Id. at 1016-26.
69. Id.
70. Joughin, Academic Due Process, in ACADEMIC FREEDOm, THE SCHOLAR'S PLACE IN
MODERN SOCIETY 143-82 (H. BAADE & R. EVERETT, eds., 1963) [hereinafter cited as BAADE
& EvzRTT].
71. J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 19 (Crofts ed. 1947).
72. Id. at 20.
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Clearly, an avowed Communist or Marxist, anarchist, atheist and agnostic
should be encouraged to be on a university faculty, provided he is scho-
lastically competent.
As modern men have become emancipated and deprived of the guid-
ance and support of traditional and customary authority, such as the
Church, the academic community has become the only source for true
knowledge. This company of scholars, scattered throughout the globe,
has mastered the criteria for measuring truth and knowledge and is duty
bound to hear one another. They comprise the only court as the source
for authority and knowledge in the modern world. "Because modern man
in his search for truth has turned away from kings, priests, commissars
and bureaucrats, he is left, for better or worse, with the professors."
73
As Walter Lippmann stated,
In his relations with the laws of the land, a professor is as sub-
ject as any other man to the laws against murder, robbery, cheat-
ing on the income tax, driving his automobile recklessly. The
laws for him, as for all other men, are what the law-enforcing
authorities say they are. The professor has no special privileges
and no special immunity.
But in the field of truth and error about the nature of
things, and of the history and future of the universe and of man,
the state and its officials have no jurisdiction. When the scholar
finds that two and two make four, no policeman, no judge, no
governor, no legislator, no trustee, no rich alumnus, has any
right to ordain that two and two make five. Only other scholars
who have gone through a mathematical training equivalent to
his, and are in one way or another qualified as his peers, can
challenge his findings that two and two make four. Here, it is
the community of scholars who are the court of last resort.
It follows that they are the court of last resort in determin-
ing the qualifications of admission to the community of scholars
-that is to say, the criteria of appointment and the license to
teach. No criterion can be recognized which starts somewhere
else than in the canons of scholarship and scientific research. No
criterion is valid here because it emanates from the chamber of
commerce, or the trade union council, of the American Legion,
or the clergy, or the newspapers, or the Americans for Demo-
cratic Action, or the John Birch Society or any political party.
The selection and the tenure of the members of the community
of scholars is subject to the criterion that scholars shall be free
of any control except a stern duty to bear faithful allegiance to
the truth they are appointed to seek.7
The university, as a sanctuary for excellence, must maintain a
73. Lippman, The University and the Human Condition, 21 CHICAGO JEWISH FORUM
27 (1966). Similar ideas are expressed in Nisbet, What is an Intellectual?, 1965 CoMMxcNTRtY
at 93.
74. Id. at 29.
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climate favorable to the pursuit of truth. This means that an academic
institution cannot be operated in the manner of a private business cor-
poration because it does not turn out a product to be sold for profit. It
must function as an academic community. The concept of employer-em-
ployee relationship between the administration and the faculty cannot
apply nor may the students be treated as mere objects subject to regula-
tions and to be lectured to. The faculty must have a voice in the making
of university policy, and the students must also be given a decision-mak-
ing role.75
Three groups play the most important roles in the government of
colleges and universities, faculties, administrators and governing boards.
Broad legal powers are conferred on the governing boards. In the case
of public institutions, these boards have been delegated with authority
by state legislatures and state constitutions, while in private institutions
the corporate charter will usually confer authority on such a board.
Though the board of regents or governing board of a public institution may
be subject to some check through legislative appropriations, the boards
of trustees of private universities are responsible to no one. Many of the
members of such boards may not necessarily have an academic back-
ground. Generally, they review the educational program as a whole in
meeting the needs of the community, handle appropriations, and are the
final authority as to the hiring and firing of personnel. To handle the
routine operations of the university, the board retains administrative
officers, particularly presidents and academic deans who comprise the
link between the board and the faculty and students. At the same time,
the teaching profession creates a scholarly community. The role of faculty
decision-making in universities varies with the institution, but the better
schools permit the faculty a strong voice in policy-making. The faculty
should have the primary responsibility for determining the educational
and research policies of the institution as clearly expressed in the charter
or as set forth in legislation by the governing board. Educational and
research policies include such fundamental matters as the subject matter
and methods of instruction, requirements for admitting students, academic
performance and granting degrees, major changes in the size of the student
body, and the relative emphasis to be given to the various components
of the educational and research program. Provision should be made for
the active participation and concurrence of the faculty with regard to
appointments, promotions and dismissals of faculty members. The faculty
should also have some participation in the selection of college presidents
and academic deans who should be qualified for faculty membership by
training and experience. Heads of academic departments should be ap-
pointed after consultation with the members of that department. Provi-
sion should be made for faculty consultation regarding the expenditure
and allocation of funds for teaching and research. Provision may be made
75. See generally R. MACIVER, ACADE-IC FROEDom Ix OUR Tna (1967).
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for the participation of the faculty, as a whole, through an assembly or
through elective representation of faculty members on committees and
panels at all the administrative levels of the institution. Though the ad-
ministrative officers have the prime responsibility of communicating to
governing boards, there should also be communication through reports
by faculty committees.76
Universities with strong faculty government are able to attract the
best scholars. Where the faculty assumes a strong policy role, the faculty
member becomes committed to the particular university and is not likely
to leave. The best scholars are committed to principles of academic free-
dom and are attracted to institutions where they may enjoy this freedom.
He should be free to engage in scholarly pursuits with a minimum of in-
trusions.77
Recent campus unrest has dramatized the problem of student par-
ticipation in university policy-making. Only a small part of the student's
university education is derived from the classroom. He must be thought
of as the subject rather than the object of education.78 In the process
of free inquiry, the teacher learns as he teaches and the student teaches
as he learns, as his questions and difficulties stimulate the teacher to
better comprehension of the subject matter through the challenge of
clearer exposition and inquiry. The student must be given the freedom
to express and defend his beliefs and to question and differ. Students
should also have the opportunity to be exposed to all types of ideology
and to form diverse groups. After graduation they will be subject to the
pressures and coercions of conforming to community standards. It is only
during his college days that he has the opportunity to come into contact
with the nonconformist and to be a nonconformist himself. Exposure to
nonconformity is an essential part of his education, and it is this author's
opinion that the ideal student body should even contain groups advocat-
ing such diverse beliefs as Communism, Jeffersonian anarchism, atheism,
free love and nudism. Furthermore, if the student is to be trained as a
responsible citizen, his best training lies in having an active role in the
campus decision-making process.
76. Clark, Faculty Authority, 47 AAUP BULL. 293 (1961).
77. Id.
78. BMLINOTON, supra note 17; Commager, supra note 19. In 1947, the President's Com-
mission on Higher Education, Higher Education for Democracy: Establishing Goals, stated
at p. 14,
[Ilntegration of democratic principles into the active life of a person and a people
is not to be achieved merely by studying or discussing democracy. Classroom teach-
ing of American tradition, however excellent, will not weave its spirit into the in-
nermost fiber of students. Experience of the give and take of free men in a free
society is equally necessary. Democracy must be lived to be understood....
The statement further asserted:
[Tihe very style of life that a university embodies is itself an education in freedom.
What could be better training for democracy than the spectacle of agile minds col-
liding in the free search for knowledge.
Similar views have been expressed by M. Moos & F. ROURKE, THE CAMPUS AND THE STATE
317 (1959); MACIVER, supra note 75, Chap. XII; Taylor, The Student as a Responsible Per-
son, 19 HARV. EDUC. REv. (1949).
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As stated by the AAUP, "As members of the community, students
should be encouraged to develop the capacity for critical judgment and
to engage in independent search for the truth." 9 The statement further
asserts that students should be evaluated solely on the basis of academic
performance, not on their opinions or conduct in matters unrelated to
academic standards. Though students are responsible for learning thor-
oughly the content of any course of study, the statement asserts that
"they should be free to take reasoned exception to the data or views
offered and to reserve judgment about matters of opinion." While students
are responsible for maintaining standards of academic performance estab-
lished by their professors, "they should have protection through orderly
precedents against prejudiced or capricious academic evaluation." Infor-
mation on student views, beliefs and political associations which profes-
sors acquire in the course of their work as instructors, advisers and
counselors should be considered confidential with protection from im-
proper disclosure. Universities should have a carefully considered policy
regarding student records with transcripts stating only academic status
with data from disciplinary and counselor files not available to unautho-
rized personnel. No records should be kept which reflect the political
activities or beliefs of students. Provision should be made for the periodic
destruction of noncurrent disciplinary records.
The AAUP statement suggests standards for student affairs includ-
ing freedom from arbitrary discrimination in that all university facilities
should be open to all students with equal access and that admission to
the university should be open to all students; freedom of association in
that students should be free to organize and join associations to promote
their common interests with freedom to express opinions and to invite
speakers of their own choosing; and freedom to participate in institutional
government by having the freedom to individually and collectively express
views on institutional policy and on matters of general interest. The stu-
dent body "should have clearly defined means to participate in the formu-
lation and application of regulations affecting student affairs" and "stu-
dent governments should be protected from arbitrary interventions." In
addition, the student press and student publications should be free of
censorship and be permitted to develop their own editorial policies and
news coverage enjoying financial autonomy or independence with the
editors subscribing to the canons of responsible journalism. The state-
ment further asserts, regarding off-campus activities, that as citizens,
"students should enjoy the same freedom of speech, peaceful assembly,
and rights of action that other citizens enjoy and should not be inhibited
by the university authorities." Where student activities result in violation
of laws, university officials should apprise students of their legal rights and
may offer other assistance. The statement takes the following position re-
garding the disciplining of such students:
79. EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN, supra note 57, at 1042-47.
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Students who violate the law may incur penalties prescribed by
civil authorities, but institutional authority should never be used
merely to duplicate the function of general laws. Only where the
institution's interests as an academic community are distinct
from those of the general community should the special authority
of the institution be asserted. The student who incidentally vio-
lates institutional regulations in the course of his off campus
activity, such as those relating to class attendance, should be
subject to no greater penalty than would normally be imposed.
Institutional action should be independent of community pres-
sure.
80
Regarding disciplinary proceedings, the statement suggests proce-
dural safeguards which include the requirement that standards of conduct
and offense be clearly defined and such vague phrases as "undesirable
conduct" and "conduct injurious to the best interests of the institution"
should be avoided. Except under emergency circumstances, premises oc-
cupied by students and their personal possessions should not be subject
to search unless appropriate authorization be obtained, and students de-
tected or arrested in the course of violating institutional rules or laws
should be informed of their rights and not be subject to harassment to
coerce admission of guilt. The status of the student should not be altered
pending action on the charges. The formality of the procedure to which
a student is entitled in disciplinary cases should be proportionate to the
gravity of the offense and the sanctions which may be imposed with minor
penalties assessed informally under prescribed procedures. The student
should have a right to a hearing before a regularly constituted committee
with regard to misconduct which may result in serious penalties. The
committee should be comprised of faculty members and, if the accused
so requests, student members. The student should be informed in writing
of the reasons for the proposed disciplinary hearing and given the oppor-
tunity to prepare with the right of assistance by an adviser of his choice.
The burden of proof should rest upon those bringing the charge, with the
student given the opportunity to testify and present evidence and wit-
nesses. He should have the opportunity to hear and question adverse
witnesses, and the committee should not consider adverse statements
unless the student has been informed of their content. The decision should
be based only upon the evidence presented. In absence of a transcript,
there should be both a digest and a verbatim record such as a tape re-
corder. The decision of the hearing committee should be final subject to
appeal to the governing board.
The American Civil Liberties Union has issued a statement regard-
ing student rights which provides that students who are arrested or con-
victed for violation of laws in the course of engaging in first amendment
activities or civil rights should be given particular assistance, and the
80. Id. at 1045.
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records of such convictions should be separated from other student
records.8
Clearly, academic freedom means the right to engage freely in the
pursuit of knowledge. It encompasses the right of a professor to be free
from the threat of arbitrary suspension and of the student to develop his
intellectual faculties in a setting free from arbitrary disciplinary action
where he may be given the maximum freedom to express himself. Acad-
emic freedom requires the maintenance of a viable academic community
where faculty members participate in the governing of the university and
the students are also given a voice in the decision-making of this com-
munity. There is no sovereign in such a community.
II. JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Academic freedom as a legal and constitutional right has yet to be
established.82 The courts have, however, upheld the rights of teachers,
professors and students in a number of decisions and dicta in a number
of Supreme Court decisions, thereby indicating a disposition toward estab-
lishing this right. Academic freedom may be regarded as an emerging
constitutional right."8
A. The Rights of Professors
The courts in the older cases refused to recognize a right to academic
freedom as such. This was reflected in the Tennessee Supreme Court's
decision in Scopes v. State, 4 involving the challenge to the constitution-
ality of the Tennessee statute forbidding the teaching of evolution which
was upheld as a valid legislative regulation. The courts have never
emerged as an instrument for defining the scope of freedom of curriculum
inquiry and expression. 5 However, in Meyer v. Nebraska,8" the United
States Supreme Court declared a statute which forbade the teaching of
any subject in a public, private or parochial school in any language other
81. Id. at 1047.
82. Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1050 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law]. The argument has, however, been made
that academic freedom is a recognized legal right. Cowan, Interference with Academic Free-
dom: The Pre-Natal History of a Tort, 4 WAYNE L. REV. 205 (1958).
83. Murphy, Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional Right, in BAADE AND
EvaEarr, supra note 70, at 17 [hereinafter cited as Murphy].
84. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927). In Kay v. Board of Higher
Educ., 173 Misc. 943, 18 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct., 1940), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 879, 20 N.Y.S.2d
1016, aff'd, 260 App. Div. 9, 20 N.Y.S.2d 898, motion to appeal denied, 284 N.Y. 578, 284
N.Y. 819 (Sup. Ct. 1950), affirmed without opinion, a taxpayer's suit successfully enjoined
Bertrand Rullell from teaching at the City College of New York because of his writings
on marriage and morals.
85. Developments in the Law, supra note 8, at 1053. A challenge to an Arkansas statute
making the teaching of evolution a misdemeanor was dismissed in Epperson v. State, 242
Ark. 922, 416 S.W.2d 322 (1967), appeal filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3180 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1967)
(No. 749).
86. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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than English or in teaching any language other than the English language
until the pupil had completed the eighth grade as an unreasonable in-
fringement upon liberty without due process as guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment. Similar statutes in Hawaii have also been invalidated.8 7
The rights of teachers have been recognized by the courts in cases
involving extra-mural associations within the context of state-imposed
loyalty and security programs proscribing membership and activities in
certain organizations and in imposing loyalty oaths. The Supreme Court
has apparently taken the position that, though specific acts may be made
the basis for exclusion or dismissal, associational activities which could not
be penalized criminally do not justify denial of public employment. 8
In Wieman v. Updegraff, the court invalidated an Oklahoma statute which
required all state employees to state on oath that they were not and had
not been for the past five years members of organizations listed by the
United States Attorney General as Communist front or subversive be-
cause of indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing member-
ship. The action had been brought by college faculty members, and this
prompted Mr. Justice Frankfurter to write a concurring opinion in which
he was joined by Mr. Justice Douglas stressing the importance of pro-
tecting first amendment rights for teachers, the need for "habits of open
mindedness," and further stressing that teachers are "the exemplars of
open mindedness" who "must have the freedom of responsible inquiry...
to sift evanescent doctrine, qualified by time and circumstance, from the
restless, enduring process of extending the bounds of understanding and
wisdom, to assure which the freedoms of thought, of speech, of inquiry,
of worship are guaranteed by the Constitution . . ." and that "the func-
tions of educational institutions in our national life and the conditions
under which alone they can adequately perform them are at the basis
of these limitations upon state and national power."89
The Court, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire" reversed a contempt con-
viction of a professor who had refused to answer questions posed by the
state Attorney General authorized to function as a one-man legislative
committee to ferret out subversive activity as to membership in the Pro-
gressive Party in 1948, holding that the authorizing statute for investi-
gation of "subversive persons" and "subversive organizations" was too
broadly drawn. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, writing the opinion of the
Court, stated,
We believe that there unquestionably was an invasion of peti-
tioner's liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political
expression-areas in which government should be extremely
reticent to tread.
87. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Mo Hock Ke Lok Po v. Stainback,
74 F. Supp. 852 (D. Hawaii, 1947).
88. Developments in the Law, supra note 82, at 1066.
89. 344 U.S. 183, 196-97 (1952).
90. 354 U.S. 234 (1967).
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The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self evident. No one should underestimate
the vital role in a democracy played by those who guide and
train our youth. To impose any straight jacket upon the intel-
lectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the
future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly
comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made.
Particularly is this true in the social sciences, where few, if any,
principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish
in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and stu-
dents must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evalu-
ate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our
civilization will stagnate and die.9 '
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, stated,
According to the [New Hampshire Supreme] court, the facts
that made reasonable the Committee's belief that petitioner had
taught violent overthrow in his lecture were that he was a Social-
ist with a record of affiliation with groups cited by the Attorney
General of the United States or the House Un-American Activi-
ties Committee and that he was co-editor of an article stating
that, although the authors hated violence, it was less to be de-
plored when used by the Soviet Union than by capitalist coun-
tries.
When weighed against the grave harm resulting from
governmental intrusion into the intellectual life of a university,
such justification for compelling a witness to discuss the contents
of his lecture appears grossly inadequate. Particularly is this so
where the witness has sworn that neither in the lecture nor at
any other time did he ever advocate overthrowing the Govern-
ment by force and violence.
Progress in the natural sciences is not remotely confined
to findings made in the laboratory. Insights into the mysteries
of nature are born of hypothesis and speculation. The more so is
this true in the pursuit of understanding in the groping endeavors
of what are called the social sciences, the concern of which is
man and society. . . . For society's good-if understanding be
an essential need of society-inquiry into these problems, specu-
lations about them, stimulation in others of reflection upon them,
must be left as unfettered as possible. Political power must ab-
stain from intrusion into this activity of freedom, pursued in
the interest of wise government and the people's well being,
except for reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling.
These pages need not be burdened with proof, based on
the testimony of a cloud of impressive witnesses, of the depen-
dence of a free society on free universities. This means the exclu-
sion of governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a
university. It matters little whether such intervention occurs
91. Id. at 250.
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avowedly or through action that inevitably tends to check the
ardor and fearlessness of scholars, qualities at once so fragile
and so indispensible for fruitful academic labor .... 92
Frankfurter's opinion balanced the interests of the legislature in making
inquiries regarding subversive activities with the overriding interests of
the first amendment and academic freedom and found that the interests
of the state were not compelling in this particular case. The decision did
not indicate that first amendment rights and academic freedom would
override state interests under all circumstances.
This limited approach was reflected in Barenblatt v. United States,93
where the Court upheld the contempt conviction of a defendant who had
invoked the first amendment in refusing to answer questions elicited from
a House Un-American Activities subcommittee. Though the defendant
had been a teacher when summoned to appear before the subcommittee,
his contract had expired when he did actually appear and his contract
was not renewed. He refused to answer questions as to whether he had
been a Communist Party member while at another university. Though
Mr. Justice Harlan reaffirmed the right of a teacher to be free from
government encroachment, the Sweezy case was distinguished in that he
had not been questioned about his academic activities and that the in-
vestigation was more limited.
In Shelton v. Tucker,94 the Supreme Court in a class action struck
down an Arkansas statute, aimed at the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People, which required that every teacher, as a
condition for employment in the state school system, execute an affidavit
disclosing every organization with which he had been associated over a
five-year period. Though the Court acknowledged that the state may
make relevant inquiries as to a teacher's competence and that the statute
was relevant, the inquiry was so unlimited and indiscriminate as to con-
stitute a prior restraint on the exercise of constitutionality recognized
first amendment freedoms as incorporated into the fourteenth. The opin-
ion relied upon Sweezy, ignoring Barenblatt.
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination may also
limit the penalizing of teachers for refusal to answer questions. In
Slcohower v. Board of Higher Education,95 the Court held that the dis-
missal of a Brooklyn College professor for invoking the privilege before
a congressional committee inquiring into national security was unconsti-
tutional. But in Beilan v. Board of Public Education,96 the Court upheld
the dismissal of a teacher for refusing to answer questions posed by his
superintendent about his allegedly subversive past activities by holding
that the dismissal was not predicated on an impermissible inference of
92. Id. at 261-62.
93. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
94. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
95. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
96. 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
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guilt drawn from a refusal to answer, but on a finding of insubordination
derived from the very fact of refusal to answer. Slochower was distin-
guished in that Beilan was a specific, relevant inquiry into the fitness of
the teacher by his superior and a specific finding of incompetency based
on permissible inferences. A similar approach was taken in Nelson v.
County of Los Angeles,"7 involving public employees. However, the cur-
rent authority of these cases may be questioned by the Court's decision in
Spevak v. Kelin,98 which reversed the disbarment of a lawyer who in-
voked the privilege against self-incrimination when asked to produce
certain evidence in a judicial inquiry of unethical practices in the legal
profession. A plurality of justices held that the fifth amendment "should
not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the
deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it." If applied broadly,
this decision could protect teachers and all public employees. However,
the case of a teacher is distinguishable from that of a lawyer, as in
Spevak; for to require the state to produce evidence procured wholly
through its own investigative efforts to prove the unsuitability of every
applicant or public employee would impose a heavy burden on the state,
while bar associations have their own ethics committees to aid the state
in such functions. Since the state is responsible for the ethical acts of its
agents, but not of its licensees, it has a greater interest in assuring their
fitness. Disbarment, bearing the official imprimatur of the courts, has
more of the elements of the stigma of a criminal proceeding than has the
loss of employment. 99
The Supreme Court has generally looked with disfavor upon the
imposition of loyalty oaths requiring teachers to deny membership of
association in certain organizations. This was reflected in the case of
Wieman v. Updegraf,10° which has already been discussed. In Speiser v.
Randall,""' the Court struck down a California statute which required a
loyalty oath for obtaining certain tax exemptions as, in effect, imposing
the burden of proof on the taxpayers to show that they were entitled to
the exemptions which was not satisfied until they had executed the oath.
The Court held that, where the transcendent value of free speech is in-
volved, the state bears the burden of persuasion to show the state tax-
payers engaged in criminal speech. The procedure was found to place an
unconstitutional burden on speech. A Florida oath, requiring a school
teacher to swear, as a condition of employment, that he had never lent his
"aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the Communist Party" was
invalidated as too vague.10 2
97. 362 U.S. 1 (1960).
98. 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967).
99. Developments in the Law, supra note 82, at 1076-77.
100. See note 89, supra.
101. 357 U.S. 513 (1958). The problem of loyalty oaths is discussed generally in Morris,
Academic Freedom and Loyalty Oaths, in BAADE & EVERETT, supra note 70, at 57.
102. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
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In Bagget v. Bullitt,'0 3 the Court struck down a Washington oath
which was challenged by sixty-four members of the faculty, staff and
student body of the University of Washington. Teachers were required
to swear that they will by "precept and example promote respect for the
flag and the institutions of the United States of America and the State of
Washington, reverence for law and order and undivided allegiance to the
government of the United States." These oath requirements were incor-
porated in a 1955 statute which prohibited "subversive persons" from
state employment. Subversive person was defined to mean any person
"who commits, attempts to commit, or aids in the commission of any act
intended to overthrow, destroy or alter, or assist in the overthrow, destruc-
tion or alteration of the constitutional form of the government of the United
States, or of the State of Washington.... ." The act similarly defined sub-
versive organization and foreign subversive organization and declared the
Communist Party a subversive organization and membership therein a
subversive activity. The Court found the oath requirements and statu-
tory provisions unduly vague, uncertain and broad. Under the 1955 sta-
tute, the teacher had to swear that he was not a subversive person. The
court found that oaths do not provide an "ascertainable standard of con-
duct or that it does not require more than a State may command under the
guarantee of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." There is the hazard
of prosecution for knowing but guiltless behavior.
In Elfbrandt v. Russell, °4 the Court invalidated the Arizona oath
which required the teacher to swear support and allegiance to the Con-
stitutions of the United States and Arizona. The legislature had placed
a gloss on the oath by subjecting to prosecution for perjury and discharge
for any person who "knowingly and wilfully becomes and remains a mem-
ber of the Communist Party of the United States or its successors or any
of its subordinate organizations" or "any other organization" having for
"one of its purposes" the overthrow of the government of Arizona or any
of its political subdivisions. The Court found that the oath and the accom-
panying gloss do not exclude association by one who does not subscribe
to the organization's unlawful ends and, therefore, threatens freedom of
association protected by the first amendment. Similarly, in Keyishian v.
Board of Regents,10 5 the Court struck down a New York loyalty scheme
103. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
104. 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
105. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). The case in effect overrules the Court's earlier decision in
Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952). The Court found the terms treason and
seditious as set forth in the statute to be vague. Mr. Justice Brennan, in writing the opinion
for the Court reaffirmed the principle of academic freedom:
Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That free-
dom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate
laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. "The vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools .. .. "
The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future depends
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
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seeking to exclude teachers who were affiliated with organizations de-
termined by the State Board of Regents to be subversive as based upon
notice and hearings with an annual inquiry to be made to determine
whether the teacher was qualified. The Court held that mere membership
in a subversive organization was insufficient as a basis for disqualification
from employment; the teacher must, in addition, have a specific intent to
bring about the illegal objectives of the association. In so holding, the Court
equated the requirement for criminal prosecution with the requirements
for exclusion from public employment, apparently on the assumption that
mere membership is no more relevant to a teacher's suitability to teach
than it is to his danger to society generally. Mr. Chief Justice Warren's
opinion for the Court quotes approvingly from his opinion in Sweezy with
regard to academic freedom. The words treasonable or seditious acts in
the disclaimer oath were found to be too broad.
Recently, in Whitehall v. Elkins,1 6 the Court invalidated a Maryland
oath requiring teachers to swear they were not "engaged in one way or
another in the attempt to overthrow the Government . . . by force or
violence." The oath was construed to be read in conjunction with a Mary-
land statute which defines a subversive as
any person who commits, attempts to commit, or aids in the com-
mission, or advocates, abets, advises or teaches by any means
any person to commit, attempt to commit, or aid in the commis-
sion of any act intended to overthrow, destroy or alter, or to
assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of the constitu-
tional form of the Government of the United States, or of the
State of Maryland... by revolution, force or violence; or who is
a member of a subversive organization....
Subversive organization was defined, inter alia, as a group that would alter
the form of government by revolution, force or violence. The Court held
that "the oath required must not be so vague and broad as to make men of
common intelligence speculate at their peril on its meaning." The words in
one way or another might suggest that a person who was a member of a
group seeking to overthrow the government by force or violence might
have perjured himself even if he was ignorant of the real aims of the
group and innocent of any illicit purpose. The line between permissible
and impermissible conduct is indistinct. The Court stressed that first
amendment rights were involved in relation to teachers, holding that "the
continuing surveillance which this type of law places on teachers is hostile
to academic freedom" in that aside from possible perjury reasonable
grounds for belief a person is a subversive person was cause for discharge.
The due process clause has been increasingly invoked to protect
discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection ..
Id. at 603.
106. 88 S. Ct. 184 (1967).
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teachers from being arbitrarily dismissed. 10 7 The privilege doctrine, that
a position of employment is not a constitutional right, has declined in
significance in that the teacher is entitled to be protected from summary
dismissal. The courts have held that though no one has the right to a
particular government job, the state has no license to embark on a discrim-
inatory hiring policy or any other arbitrary or capricious course of
action.1 8 Specific constitutional safeguards were not recognized. The
Court's rationale presumes the existence of a substantive constitutional
liberty which has been denied without due process. It has avoided the
requirement that there be "life, liberty or property" to invoke the pro-
tection of the fourteenth amendment. A hearing of some sort must be
provided.
In many instances, particularly regarding professors, rights are pro-
tected by tenure which provide for a hearing. Dismissal may occur only
for specific cause. Absent tenure, the teacher may have contractual rights
under his contract of employment. These rights may be subject to judicial
enforcement. However, a tenure system creates what is in substance pri-
vate grievance machinery operating under privately developed standards.
Failure to comply may subject the institution to an action for damages.
But, if the formal procedures are followed, a court may decline to con-
sider even an indefensible result in a contract action, unless a specific
contract term has been violated.
Despite the Supreme Court precedents, the exercise of academic
freedom has not been established as a substantive legal right. Exempli-
fying this attitude is Koch v. Board of Trustees of the University of
Illinois,'09 in which the Illinois Supreme Court found no constitutional
issues involved in the dismissal of a biology professor, employed under a
two-year contract, who was dismissed during his first year after writing a
letter to the student newspaper stating, inter alia, that "premarital inter-
course among college students is not, in and of itself, improper." The
President found his views "offensive, repugnant and contrary to commonly
accepted standards of morality and his espousal of these views could be
interpreted as an encouragement of immoral behavior and that for these
reasons he should be relieved of his university duties" and so relieved him.
Though a faculty committee, after a hearing, recommended reprimand
rather than a discharge, the Board of Trustees ordered his discharge after
the first academic year. Koch then brought an action for breach of con-
tract which was dismissed by the trial court, and an appeal was taken to
the Illinois Supreme Court alleging a constitutional issue. The appeal was
denied. The case was then transferred to the Appellate Court which
affirmed the dismissal of the case.
The Florida Supreme Court rejected the concept of academic free-
107. Developments in the Law, supra note 82, at 1077.
108. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
109. 39 Ill. App. 2d 51, 187 N.E.2d 340 (1962), discussed in Murphy, supra notc V.
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dom. in Jones v. Board of Control,10 a case involving the dismissal of a
University of Florida law professor prior to the expiration of his one-year
contract for violation of a rule prohibiting an employee of the university
from engaging in political activities. The professor sought election to the
post of circuit judge. The court upheld the dismissal on grounds of rea-
sonable regulation of public employment, though rejecting the concept
of academic freedom.
However, in a case involving the dismissal of a high school teacher,
the Supreme Court has held that a teacher may not be dismissed for
writing a letter to a newspaper expressing criticism of a school adminis-
tration with regard to educational policies or the allocating of public
funds."'
B. The Rights of Students
In the older cases the courts manifested unconcern as to the rights
of students. Universities were conceived as acting in loco parentis com-
bining the responsibilities of the church, the civil and criminal law, and the
home in the rearing of the young." 2 They were surrogate parents endowed
with vast discretion. Accordingly, courts were unconcerned if a student
was dismissed without a hearing or inquiry into the cause. A student, sus-
pended "for the general good and reputation of the institution," was with-
out judicial recourse, even when that determination was made without
written charges, confrontation, or cross-examination of witnesses."' In
some of these cases constitutional protection could be sought, such as
where a student was dismissed for nonattendance at chapel in a state in-
stitution, but even in such cases the typical action was for mandamus
based on the discretion of state courts and premised upon common law
notions of property or contract.
Courts have traditionally based their approach on contract, on the
assumption that the provisions of the student-university contract are to
be found in all of the statements contained in the admissions application,
the registration form, the school's rules and the catalogue." 4 Included in
the catalogue or registration form may be a statement that the school
reserves the power to cancel a student's registration, to refuse to award
academic credits, or to deny a certificate or degree without having to state
a reason for its action. The enforcement of such a clause was upheld in
Anthony v. Syracuse University"' involving a coed who was dismissed
for not being "a typical Syracuse girl." Many other cases have followed
110. 131 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1961).
111. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 88 S. Ct. 1731 (1968).
112. Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule Making Powers of Public
Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAw IN TRANs. QJ. 1 (1965).
113. State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 P. 433 (1928), cert. denied,
277 U.S. 591 (1928), appeal dismissed, 278 U.S. 661 (1928).
114. Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Students-A Fiduciary Theory, 54
KY. L.J. 643 (1966) (hereinafter cited as Goldman].
115. 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435 (1928).
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this precedent. However, the contract approach is inappropriate to
student-university relations in that contract law is based upon the hard
bargaining of self-interested persons in the market place. It is unreason-
able to bind him to terms set forth in a lengthy catalogue. The restric-
tions in selecting a school place the student in an unfair bargaining
position. Moreover, the student is in no position to renegotiate the con-
tract as stated by the provisions of the registration forms. The contract
may well be regarded as a contract of adhesion.116
Though the courts have followed a policy of judicial restraint, the
case of Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education"7 represents a signi-
ficant departure. Action was brought by students of Alabama State Col-
lege who were expelled after participating in a courthouse lunch counter
sit-in and in several other civil rights demonstrations. The President of
the college had warned some of the students to cease demonstrating,
though one of those who were warned and some other students partici-
pated in subsequent demonstrations. Otherwise, there was no formal
notice that the students were being charged with conduct which might
lead to expulsion. There was no hearing, and the notice of their expulsion
did not state specifically the conduct for which they were being expelled.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing the district court's dis-
missal of an action to enjoin the State Board and others from obstructing
the plaintiff's right to attend college, held that due process requires notice
and some opportunity for hearing before students, at a tax-supported col-
lege, are expelled for misconduct. The court held that it is not enough to
say that the students did not have a constitutional right to attend college,
as it is necessary to consider both the nature of the private interest which
is being impaired and the governmental power which has been exercised.
The students could not be said to have waived a right to notice and a hear-
ing, as the state cannot condition the granting of even a privilege upon the
renunciation of the constitutional right of procedural due process. Only
private associations have the right to obtain a waiver of notice and hear-
ing, and even in those instances the waiver must be clear and explicit. The
Court recognized that the students' right to an education was basic and
vital and expulsion would impair the students' ability to complete their
education and enter their careers. The Board, in dismissing the students,
must exercise fundamental principles of fairness. The interest in national
security is not so overwhelming as to preclude this exercise. The court
cited prior authority" 8 indicating that notice and a hearing must be held
where students are expelled. As guidance to the parties the Court set forth
the following standards as proper for such a hearing:
The notice should contain a statement of the specific charges and
grounds which, if proven, would justify expulsion under the reg-
116. Goldman, supra note 114.
117. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
118. 58 A.L.R.2d 903-20.
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ulations of the Board of Education. The nature of the hearing
should vary depending upon the circumstances of the particular
case. The case before us requires something more than an in-
formal interview with an administrative authority of the college.
By its nature, a charge of misconduct, as opposed to a failure
to meet the scholastic standards of the college, depends upon a
collection of the facts concerning the charged misconduct, easily
colored by the point of view of the witnesses. In such circum-
stances, a hearing which gives the Board or the administrative
authorities of the college an opportunity to hear both sides in
considerable detail is best suited to protect the rights of all in-
volved. This is not to imply that a full-dress judicial hearing,
with the right to cross-examine witnesses, is required. Such a
hearing, with the attending publicity and disturbance of college
activities, might be detrimental to the college's educational at-
mosphere and impractical to carry out. Nevertheless, the rudi-
ments of an adversary proceeding may be preserved without
encroaching upon the interests of the college. In the instant case,
the student should be given the names of the witnesses against
him and an oral or written report on the facts to which each wit-
ness testifies. He should also be given the opportunity to present
to the Board, or at least to an administrative official of the col-
lege, his own defense against the charges and to produce either
oral testimony or written affidavits of witnesses in his behalf. If
the hearing is not before the Board directly, the results and find-
ings of the hearing should be presented in a report open to the
student's inspection. If these rudimentary elements of fair play
are followed in a case of misconduct of this particular type, we
feel that the requirements of due process of law will have been
fulfilled."'
The question unanswered by Dixon is whether the courts extend this
precedent to require trial-type hearings with the right to cross-examine
witnesses and to present rebuttal evidence, though short of a full-dress
judicial hearing. Generally, courts have found that any type of hearing
is adequate.120 If the courts were to follow the analogy of other types of
cases, such as in the deportation of aliens,' trial-type hearings should be
provided. The Dixon precedent may be expanded. Four months after the
decision, a federal district court in Tennessee followed this precedent in
enjoining the suspension of students who had engaged in demonstrations
and had been arrested for breach of the peace.' 22 The decision was later
followed by a federal district court in Florida 2 ' and has clearly become
part of the law of the land. 24
119. 294 F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
120. Wright v. Texas Southern University, 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968).
121. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Kwong Hai Chew
v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
122. Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
123. Due v. Florida A & M Univ. 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
124. Note, Procedural Limitations on the Expulsion of College and University Students,
10 ST. Louis L.J. 542, 549 (1966).
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The courts, however, have not accepted the principle of a trial-type
hearing. The standard is that of "fair play.""' 5 The requirements include
notice of the charge and the grounds for the sanction if the charges are
proven; the names of the witnesses against him and an oral or written
report of the facts on which each would testify; and if the hearing is not
before the governing board, the findings of the determinative body should
be presented open to the student's inspection. The standard requires that,
in determining whether a student has been guilty of improper conduct,
there need not be a formal trial but that the students be given a fair
opportunity to demonstrate his innocence. Opposition to an adversary or
trial-type approach is based upon concern for demoralizing the university
because of the hesitancy of fellow students, and possibly professors, in
testifying against the student or the school.1" However, school authori-
ties were urged by one court to formulate standards for disciplinary
proceedings.1
27
The application of Dixon is well illustrated by Zanders v. Louisiana
State Board of Education,2 ' where students at a negro college were dis-
missed following engagement by the student body in demonstrations pro-
testing educational policies and involving a student blockade of the
administration building and a sit-in at the auditorium with demonstrations
and marches. Following the clearing of the campus by the National Guard
and sheriff's police, the students were dismissed by an interdepartmental
council without notification of the disciplinary charges against them, nor
given a chance to present individual defenses. An action was brought
under the Civil Rights Act, 129 and the federal district court issued a
temporary restraining order reinstating the students but reserving the
right for the college to take further disciplinary action. The college then
scheduled a second hearing notifying the students in writing of the
charges against them and informing them of the right to counsel of their
choice, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present evidence in their own
behalf. At the hearing, the chairman of the disciplinary committee an-
nounced that the college did not intend to present evidence but would
listen to evidence presented by the student alone. After two and one-half
hours of testimony, the students were again expelled. The Court then en-
larged the temporary restraining order to provide that the students could
not be expelled until afforded a right of appeal to the Louisiana State
Board of Education. The Board then conducted a hearing de novo at
which all parties were heard. Each student's case was treated individually
with direct and cross-examination. With one exception, the students chose
125. Zanders v. Louisiana St. Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968). See
note 120, supra; Note, The College Student and Due Process in Disciplinary Proceedings,
1962 U. ILL. L.F. 438.
126. Heyman, Some thoughts on University Proceedings, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 73 (1966),
who takes the position that a trial type hearing would impose a heavy expense on colleges.
State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942).
127. Zanders v. Louisiana St. Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968).
128. Id.
129. 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1959).
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not to present evidence in their own behalf. At the conclusion of the hear-
ings, the students were again expelled. The students then filed a complaint
alleging that the expulsions were discriminatory in that these particular
students were chosen for expulsion while other students who participated
in the demonstrations were unpunished, that the disciplinary committee
and the Board were biased, and that no evidence was presented regarding
the expulsion of certain students.
The court upheld the dismissals, finding that the demonstrations by
blocking buildings disrupted campus life and, therefore, engaged in
activities not protected by the first amendment. The students' action in
taking over the administration building was compared to the situation in
National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation,""
where the Supreme Court upheld the discharge of employees engaged in
a sit-down strike which involved the take-over of company buildings, and
the situation in Adderley v. Florida,'' where demonstrators had demon-
strated on property on which there was a jail. The court found that it was
the students' participation in the illegal activities which constituted the
grounds for dismissal. The college president had testified that the students
were expelled for their conduct and not for their criticism of the adminis-
tration. The Court found no evidence of bias and held that the hearing was
fair. As to the singling out of these particular students, the Court noted
that college administrations are endowed with discretionary authority and
that these students were not discriminated as a class. College officials are
not relegated to dismiss the entire student body to stop illegal activity but,
as in wild-cat strikes, may expel the leaders. The Court stated that "the
hearing before the State Board more than satisfied the 'rudiments of fair
play' set forth in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education."73 2
Further judicial clarification of disciplinary proceedings is found in
Buttney v. Smiley, 13  where the court upheld the dismissal of students
from the University of Colorado for blocking admission to the University
Placement Service by standing in doorways to the offices in protesting
CIA recruitment. The students were granted a hearing in conformity with
established procedures and appeal was made to the Board of Regents.
The court found the rules were not vague. The students were charged with
violating rules against hazing, "interfering with the personal liberty of
other students," and the requirement to obey national, state and local
laws, to respect the rights and privileges of other people and conduct
themselves in "a manner that reflects credit on the university." Though
the rules were not in the form of specific prohibitions, "they do set stan-
dards for acceptable conduct which are readily determinable and should
be easily understood." Though the court recognized that the doctrine of
"in loco parentis" is no longer tenable in a university community and
130. 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
131. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
132. 281 F. Supp. 747, 767-68.
133. 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968).
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that there is a trend to reject the authority of university officials to regu-
late off-campus activity of students, "that is not to say that conduct
disruptive of good order on the campus should not properly lead to disci-
plinary action." The court found that the students' activity does not
encompass the exercise of free speech as guaranteed by the first amend-
ment. The students could be tried as a group because they had acted in
this manner. The court further found it was not arbitrary to impose a
more severe punishment upon graduate students. The court found that
"the test of whether or not one has been afforded procedural due process
is one of fundamental fairness in the light of the total circumstances."
Whether students in disciplinary proceedings have a right to counsel
is questionable. In Madera v. Board of Education of the City of New
York13 4 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court
decision in holding that counsel may be excluded from a guidance con-
ference with parents following suspension of a child from school which
determines how the child should be handled. The court characterized the
proceedings as non-criminal and that the District Superintendent had no
lawyer present. The court stressed that the proceedings were not adversary
in nature. The case may be applicable to the rights of college students in
that the court cited Dixon and noted there was no mention in that case of
representation by retained counsel. The court in Buttney v. Smiley held
that "we know of no legal authority that requires university officials to
advise a student involved in disciplinary proceedings of his right to remain
silent and to be provided with counsel.' 13' However, the right of counsel
was accorded the students in Zanders. It is suggested that although a uni-
versity disciplinary proceeding cannot be equated to a criminal proceed-
ing, where a student is indeed faced with the sanction of suspension, the
right to counsel should be granted. Such a right is concomitant to the
exercise of the right to cross-examine and refute witnesses, an essential
element of a fair proceeding.
The question of student demonstrations will increasingly come within
judicial ambit. A federal district court has held that prior administration
approval of all campus demonstrations was an unconstitutional re-
straint.136 It would follow that a flat ban on all campus demonstrations
would be unconstitutional. 3 7 Students have the right to petition univer-
sities for a redress of their grievances. But the university may place
reasonable restrictions on demonstrations to protect safety and property,
maintain normal operation and facilitate campus transportation. Further-
more, the university has power to preserve an atmosphere conducive to
educational pursuits. This is illustrated by Goldberg v. Regents of Uni-
versity of California 1 8 in which a California state court upheld the dis-
134. Madera v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967).
135. 281 F. Supp. 280, at 287.
136. Hammond v. South Carolina St. College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
137. Developments in the Law, supra note 82, at 1131.
138. 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
1968]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
missal of students who participated in a "filthy speech" rally during the
Berkeley protests finding the discipline necessary for maintaining order.
Courts have also refused to extend first amendment protection to acts of
students barring access to campus buildings." 9
However, the reasons for invoking school discipline to prevent ex-
cessively disruptive demonstrations on the campus do not justify the im-
position of penalties upon off-campus demonstrations, even those entail-
ing violations of criminal law. The student's conduct off campus should
justify suspension or expulsion only if it would constitute a manifestation
of his unfitness to be a member of the academic community. 4
An issue involving student academic freedom which has come to the
fore is the problem of bans, as imposed by state statutes and school rules,
prohibiting certain speakers from using school facilities to address mem-
bers of the student body. Normally directed against subversives, such rules
have been successfully challenged on the ground that the denial of school
facilities constitutes a discrimination against advocates of minority view-
points in violation of first amendment rights. Facilities for speech and
assemblage may not be withheld or restricted in such a way as to confer
monopolistic use or impede equal access. This applies to both the popular
and the unpopular cause. No restriction, prohibition or censorship of the
content of speech or advocacy should be imposed unless there are extra-
ordinarily impelling reasons involving a "clear and present" danger to
the interests of the university. 4' However, such dangers will rarely arise,
except, perhaps, in instances where a speaker may make libelous utter-
ances, incite violence, or advocate and disseminate ethnic or religious
hatred and the promotion of genocide.
Student groups have initiated suits in Illinois and North Carolina
district courts 42 to enjoin the denial of use of university facilities to hear
addresses by controversial speakers. An Illinois statute prohibits campus
speaking invitations to any "subversive, seditious, and un-American or-
ganization, or to its representatives. . . ,,14' A North Carolina statute
charges university officials to adopt regulations governing use of school
facilities by "known" members of the Communist Party, those who ad-
vocate the overthrow of the federal or state constitution, or those who have
139. Zanders v. Louisiana St. Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968) ; Buttney
v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968).
140. Developments in the Law, supra note 82, at 1132. A related question involves stu-
dent attire and long hair. In Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th
Cir. 1968), the court upheld the dismissal of high school students, members of a musical
group, who wore long hair despite a school rule to the contrary, and the administration had
established that the wearing of long hair was conducive to student disorder and disruption.
The court, however, indicated that arbitrary regulations based merely on the personal likes
of the administrator could not be imposed.
141. Id. at 1132.
142. Snyder v. Board of Trustees, Civil No. 66-C-847 (N.D. Ill., filed May 12, 1966);
Dickson v. Siterson, Civil No. 3-59-C-66 (M.D.N.C., filed March 31, 1966).
143. Ill. REV. STAT. ch. 144 § 48.8 (1967).
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pleaded the fifth amendment before any tribunal in answer to questions
about subversive activities.144
The student's problem of standing may be met by dicta in a recent
Supreme Court case allowing the addressee of mail to challenge Post
Office seizure and indicating that it would be an anomaly if a principal
beneficiary of the first amendment, the audience, were precluded from
seeking relief because of illegal censorship.' 4 ' The denial of university
facilities to a speaker who has been extended and has accepted a specific
invitation to speak, represents a ripe issue, narrowly defined, susceptible
to judicial resolution.146
Another basis for standing is the dicta of the Supreme Court in the
cases involving the rights of faculty members which assert that academic
freedom is essential for seeking knowledge in a free society.'47 It is sub-
mitted that a speaker ban hinders the search for truth. The student at-
tends college to obtain an education and a restriction imposed upon whom
he may hear deprives him of his right to receive an education. The speaker
is invited to speak, not primarily for his own benefit, not merely to accord
him an opportunity to propagate his ideas, but to provide the student
with an educational experience in hearing what he has to say. As one
judge stated in dismissing a taxpayer's suit to enjoin the University of
Buffalo from permitting Communist Party theoretician Herbert Aptheker
from speaking,
Petitioner contends that allowing avowed communists to preach
their ideology at a tax-supported university cloaks their activi-
ties with a mantle of academic and intellectual integrity which
makes their subversive propaganda more susceptible to im-
pressionable young people, but we believe that the tradition of
our great society has been to allow our universities in the name
of academic freedom to explore and expose their students to con-
troversial issues without governmental interference. Teachers
and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and
to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise
our civilization will stagnate and die .... 148
A speaker ban is a prior restraint on speech. Though the state might
justify a uniform prohibition on use of facilities to prevent a diversion of
student time and use of campus space and require students to bear any
144. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 116-199, 116-200 (1966). The rights of speakers on state uni-
versity campuses is discussed in Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities: Some
Constitutional Considerations, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 328 (1963) ; Note, Freedom of Speech on
College Campus, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 549 (1963); Pollitt, Campus Censorship: State Barring
Speakers from State Educational Institutions, 42 N.C.L. REv. 179 (1963).
145. Lamount v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307-10 (1965) (Brennan & Goldberg,
JJ. concurring) allowing addressee of mail to challenge seizure.
146. Developments in the Law, supra note 82, at 1133.
147. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 254 U.S. 234 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967).
148. Egan v. Moore, 20 App. Div. 2d 150, 245 N.Y.S.2d 622, 14 N.Y.2d 775, 250 N.Y.S.2d
609, 199 N.E.2d 842 (1964).
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marginal costs incurred by the university, existing bans are not addressed
to these problems but are selective, denying facilities to a particular class
of speakers defined by past actions or previously expressed views. A pro-
hibition resting solely on the credentials of the speaker is unjustifiable.
An argument could be made that the university must be free to deny
the use of campus facilities to speakers whose subject is not amenable
to scholarly or intellectual inquiry, so that a speech adding nothing to
the students' educational experience would be inconsistent with the law-
fully dedicated use of university property. However, to sanction even a
narrowly drawn ban directed at the speaker's subject matter could be
subject to abuse as almost any controversial speaker could be excluded as
"noneducational." If the courts confer subject matter censorship on uni-
versities, a broad conception of the uses to which universities are dedi-
cated should be adopted. If the university makes its facilities available
for discussion of a particular issue or subject, it should not be permitted
to exclude representatives of particular positions.'49
The right of student newspapers to freely criticize the university ad-
ministration, even when supported by state funds, has been judicially recog-
nized by a court which found unconstitutional as an infringement of first
amendment rights the dismissal of a student editor who criticized the
Alabama Legislature in an editorial in violation of a school rule prohibit-
ing such criticism.'5 However, the court indicated that the expulsion
might have been upheld if a reasonable relation could be found to the
maintenance of order and discipline. It remains to be seen if the principle
can be extended to prevent the firing of student editors or the preventing
of distribution of student publications. Though restraints on the student
press might justly be imposed which the state could not impose on the
press generally, students should have the opportunity to freely express
themselves. A rule banning criticism not based on demonstrable fact would
be justifiable to encourage responsible editorial comment.''
C. Rights in Private Universities
The fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights statutes require state
action or action under color of law as a basis for jurisdiction. An element
of state action must be found if constitutional rights are to be invoked to
149. Developments in the Law, supra note 82, at 1132-33.
150. Dickey v. Alabama St. Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967). An action
in the United States District Court, Case No. 68 C 717, Scoville v. Bd. of Educ. challenged
the suspension of two 17-year-old high school students following the distribution of an un-
authorized publication. Judge Alexander J. Napoli heard on July 19, 1968, that under the
state statutes the School Board had sufficient delegated authority to make a finding of gross
misconduct and that no federal ground existed that would apply to a state-supported high
school. Judge Napoli followed the precedent of the California case wherein the district court
of appeal applied the first amendment differently to high school students than college
students. Robinson v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist., 245 A.C.A. 311, 53 Cal. Rptr.
781 (1966), noted 55 CALw. L. REv. 911 (1967).
151. Developments in the Law, supra note 82, at 1130.
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protect students or faculty members.152 There has been an expansion of
the concept of state action so as to encompass private schools, casting
doubt on those cases which had held that private schools had no four-
teenth amendment obligation. State action may be found where sufficient
state involvement exists, such as a free library receiving appropriations
from a city. 53 In Griffin v. State Board of Education,'154 state action was
found in that state aid was determinative to perpetuate segregation where
tuition grants were made to students to attend private schools. The Court
found the aid necessary to the school's existence even though no state
effort was made to make the schools discriminate. However, the courts
have not extended this approach beyond cases where the school's entire
budget emanates from the state.'55 In the absence of direct financial con-
trol, the role of state agents in administering a school may give them
control.
Even when the institution is not an instrumentality of the state nor
controlled by it, specific acts or policies may be permeated with state
control to such a degree as to call for constitutional protection.'56 When
the state does not finance or closely regulate the institution or the ques-
tioned activity, courts have found that certain combinations of factors
relating the state to the private sector may provide a sufficient nexus to
justify a finding of state action. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author-
ity, '5 the Court found state action in segregation by a private restaurant
leased in a public building. In Evans v. Newton, state action was found
as to a private park situation adjacent to a public park.'
With this approach, state action may often be found in that private
schools use state and federal funds, participate in governmental programs,
receive tax immunities, or enjoy special protection afforded charitable in-
stitutions. Moreover, many private universities are chartered by the state
and must comply with state educational requirements. These indicia were
found in the most updated Girard College case.'5 9 In Simkins v. Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital, ' state action was found with regard to a pri-
vate hospital in that it received federal and state aid and the state had
152. Id. at 1056.
153. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
721 (1945).
154. 239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965).
155. Developments in the Law, supra note 82, at 1057.
156. Id.; Public Util. Comm. v. Pollock, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
157. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
158. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
159. Pennsylvania v. Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967). In Guillory v. Admin-
istrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962), judgment vacated and new
trial ordered, 207 F. Supp. 554, aff'd per curiam, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.), rev'd on retrial,
212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962). Judge Skelley Wright examined the connections between
Tulane University and the State of Louisiana and found state action in that it had been a
state institution, enjoyed a special franchise and charter with tax exemption and state officials
had served on its board of trustees. The case was reversed at a new trial, 212 F. Supp. 674
(E.D. La. 1967).
160. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
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picked it as part of a federal aid plan. Another approach might be to find
the university engaged in state action because it assumes a public func-
tion, a rationale which has been applied to company towns and party
primaries. 6 ' However, these cases involved the issue of race, and the
courts might not be inclined to find state action in other areas. A sound
approach might be to find state action under either a control, indicia or
public function approach and then recognize that the demands of equal
protection and due process vary with the institution and issue involved.
The objectives of the college, such as where it is a religious institution,
might be taken into account. 16 2
In the case of private schools the courts still follow the contract
approach in determining whether the student's discipline comports with
due process. In Carr v. St. John's University, 1 3 the appellate division
reversed a lower court decision ordering the reinstatement of students who
were expelled after a hearing before a faculty committee for participating
in a civil wedding ceremony in violation of the tenets of the Catholic reli-
gion. The college catalogue had provided that "in conformity with the
ideals of Christian education and conduct, the University reserves the
right to dismiss a student at any time on whatever ground the University
judges advisable." The trial court found this language too vague. In revers-
ing, the appellate division reasoned that the customary use of the terms
gave the students sufficient clarity as to their meaning. The court of
appeals affirmed without an opinion, but two judges dissented, arguing
that no distinction should be made between private and public institu-
tions of learning because of the nexus with the state.'64 The distinction
between public and private, though still accepted, is highly technical.6 5
One suggested approach which may increase legal protection for stu-
dents in both public and private universities is to regard the student-
university relationship as fiduciary in nature. This places confidence and
trust in the university to receive an education, reposing confidence in its
skill and abilities. As a fiduciary, the university cannot exercise any action
161. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
162. Developments in the Law, supra note 82, at 1061.
163. 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1962).
164. 12 N.Y.2d 802, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834, 187 N.E.2d 18 (1962).
165. Note, Procedural Limitations on the Expulsion of College and University Students,
10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 542 (1966). One writer has observed:
Many persuasive reasons can be asserted for applying the Fourteenth Amendment
to private as well as state supported schools. When private property is used in a
manner which substantially affects the community at large, it is clothed with a
public interest and comes within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Private
universities require state license or charter, generally receiving special tax treatment
and unquestionably perform an essential public service. It requires no great expansion
of accepted concepts to constitutional law to find that the guarantees secured by
the Fourteenth Amendment are applicable in measuring the legality of the conduct
of a private university. Thus, one judge recently observed that: "[A]dministrators
of a private college . . . do the work of the state, often in place of the state. Does
it not follow that they stand in the state's shoes? And, if so, are they not then agents
of the state, subject to the constitutional restraints on government action to the same
extent as private persons who govern a company town?"
Guillory v. Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. La. 1962). Goldman, supra note 114, at 650.
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which has the taint of unreasonableness, unfairness or arbitrariness.
Given this fiduciary relationship, the courts would have the duty to ex-
amine the university's conduct. The university would then have the fidu-
ciary burden of proving the integrity of its educational trust and of
establishing that it acted in a just and reasonable manner. As a fiduciary
the university would then have a duty to the general community, the
student, and the parents. 6
III. THE OMBUDSMAN-A PROPOSAL FOR PROTECTING
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The judiciary is an imperfect means for the protection of academic
freedom, regardless of whether the rights of students or of faculty mem-
bers are involved. Litigation is expensive and may be protracted. More-
over, the courts may be invoked in only the most extreme cases, and its
concept of academic freedom and academic due process may be more
limited than what is commonly recognized in the academic community." 7
Furthermore, courts are not well equipped to develop educational policies.
Academic due process and academic freedom can best be promoted
and protected by the establishment of an academic Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman idea, originating in the Scandinavian countries, envisions the
establishment of an institution to rectify arbitrary governmental action
and mistakes with authority to lodge complaints, initiate judicial action
and propose legislative reform." 8 The institution has been adopted
throughout the world and proposals have been made for its establishment,
in varied form, at the national, state and local levels of American govern-
ment.1 69 As an institutional device, the Ombudsman is peculiarly adapted
to secure academic due process by examining complaints of infringement
upon faculty or student rights and in suggesting changes in university
administrative policies. Conceivably, such an institution could function
as an adjunct of the university administration itself, acting as an inde-
pendent entity. But where, as has happened at a number of universities
such as Columbia, the university administration has been beset with dis-
trust and complete loss of confidence by a substantial portion of the aca-
demic community, the Ombudsman would function most effectively if it
were wholly independent of the university administration. The institution
might set set up through legislative action at the state or federal level, but
the general distrust in this country for uniform government regulation of
education, particularly as affecting private education, suggests that the
better approach would be to establish the academic Ombudsman as a non-
166. Goldman, supra note 114.
167. Murphy, supra note 83, at 54.
168. See generally W. GELLHORN, OMBUDSMAN AND OTHERS (1967); The Ombudsman
or Citizen's Defender: A Modern Institution, 377 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & Soc.
Sci. (May 1968); OMBUDSMAN FOR AMERICAN GOVERNMENT? (Anderson, ed., 1968) [here-
inafter cited as ANDERSON].
169. ANDERSON, supra note 168.
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governmental entity. It would best function as an adjunct to college and
university accrediting agencies with the threat of withholding or denying
accreditation as a means for enforcement of its recommendations.
A precedent for an academic Ombudsman exists in the American
Association of University Professors which delegates committees to under-
take independent investigations of cases involving the denial of academic
due process to college professors. It examines each case and if a denial of
academic due process is found, it seeks redress and an adoption by the
university of a change in policies. 7 ' Each case is considered in the light
of advancing the principles of academic freedom, with the interest of the
individual faculty member submerged to this overriding goal. The Asso-
ciation renders advisory opinions interpreting its broad statement on aca-
demic freedom which was formulated in 1940 and from time to time
issues supplementary statements. Reports are also issued of investiga-
tions of particular cases with decisions enforceable by pressures, such as
threatened boycotts of the institutions which are involved, i.e., professors
are informed not to seek employment at these universities. However,
reports of prior investigations are not treated as precedents as each report
purports to be a de novo application of the basic principles of the 1940
statement. But an increasing tendency has been manifested for the codi-
fication of decisions.
In many academic freedom disputes the AAUP also plays a role as
mediator. When a satisfactory settlement of the dispute cannot be achieved
through mediation, an ad hoc investigation is conducted by a committee
composed of professors from outside the particular university involved
which then renders a decision and issues a report. The committees con-
sider the parties' opposing claims and the general conditions affecting
academic freedom in a wide ranging inquiry. A preliminary report is first
issued, which is commented upon by the parties, and then a final report is
published in the AA UP Bulletin. This approach, though assuring thor-
oughness and accuracy, has the disadvantage of causing a two-year delay
between the filing of the original complaint and the publication of the
final report. Where a serious situation exists, the institution is censured
and boycotted. In an extreme case, the AAUP may recommend that the
regional accreditation association reconsider the institution's status. Most
censured schools come in contact with the AAUP to bring about reforms.
The AAUP, in bargaining with the censured institution, may not neces-
sarily seek redress of the professor's rights, if a change in academic pol-
icies is achieved, thus subordinating the individual's interest to that of the
academic community. The AAUP functions as a restraining influence
upon the administration and the Board of Trustees. The professor feels
his own rights and intellectual autonomy will be protected as an increasing
number of complaints has been filed.
170. Joughin in BAADE & EVERETT, supra note 70; Developments in the Law, supra,
1105-12.
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The AAUP as a protector of academic due process is limited in its
effectiveness in that it does not necessarily secure the rights of the in-
dividual professor in a particular grievance. Moreover, it merely seeks to
protect the rights of professors and other faculty members with little re-
gard for the rights of students.
Another precedent for an academic Ombudsman is to be found in the
accrediting institutions. Absent a single, authoritative body to establish
uniform national standards, private accrediting agencies were created to
formulate standards of proficiency to qualitatively evaluate educational
institutions. 171 The activities of these institutions are coordinated by the
National Commission on Accreditation, created in 1950 to "accredit"
accrediting agencies. Presently, six regional and approximately thirty pro-
fessional accrediting agencies have met the National Commission's stan-
dards for acceptance. Generally, regional agencies accredit public and
private universities and colleges within its jurisdiction, evaluating each
institution's over-all program with focus on the undergraduate level while
professional agencies are national in scope, approving specific programs of
study. The National Commission has sought to promote coordination and
uniformity. The accrediting association establishes certain minimum
standards which each educational institution must meet to receive accredi-
tation. Representatives of the association visit the campus and the in-
formation obtained, along with data submitted by the institution, is
presented to a review committee which determines whether to grant or
deny accreditation. Each decision is then appealable to an internal body.
The associations recognize the autonomy of the university, being con-
cerned with the general policies of the school and refraining from inter-
fering with the institution's exercise of discretion in individual matters.
The accrediting associations have functioned as protectors of academic
freedom by refusing to recognize any institution not professing "integrity
of operation," freedom from political and governmental interference. The
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools threatened disaccreditation
of all state colleges and universities in Mississippi when the governor of
that state became involved in the racial problems of the schools of Missis-
sippi.172 The Southern Association also threatened disaccreditation of
North Carolina University after the state legislature enacted a statute
forbidding any subversive or communist-affiliated individual, or anyone,
pleading the fifth amendment in governmental investigations into sub-
versive activities, from speaking on state campuses. This threat induced
the legislature, in special session, to amend the statute.'78 The Middle
States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools conducted an in-
vestigation at St. Johns University to determine the status of academic
171. See generally Kaplin & Hunter, The Legal Status oj the Educational Accrediting
Agency: Problems in Judicial Supervision and Governmental Regulation, 52 CORNELL L.Q.
104 (1966).
172. Id. at 107.
173. Id.
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freedom in the environment of a church-related school.7 4 This Associa-
tion also refused to accredit a private preparatory school and a junior
college because of its profit motive.'75
Educational accrediting associations are incorporated and subject to
the common law of private associations. The accredited schools may be
regarded as members and must exhaust all available remedies within the
framework of the association before seeking judicial relief. Procedures for
internal appeal are generally provided. After exhaustion of remedies the
school, if excluded or expelled, may seek equitable relief. 7 ' For judicial
relief to be obtained the university must have been expelled in accor-
dance with the rules of the association; the proceedings must have been
undertaken in good faith and in accordance with "natural justice." Where
a university is excluded from an association, generally the law would not
grant relief. However, when the association enjoys a monopoly position,
because of public reliance on it, which is great enough to make member-
ship a necessity for successful operation in that area, courts may inter-
vene. An accrediting association is not truly a voluntary association since
accreditation is a prerequisite for the operation of the university, and, be-
cause it fulfills a public function, it may be regarded as a quasi-public
agency. However, courts are generally reluctant to intervene because of
the expertise involved in accreditation. The accrediting association may
be regarded as coming within the purview of the fourteenth amendment
in that their function is quasi-public and accreditation is relied upon for
distributing government funds to universities. Moreover, many state in-
stitutions are members of these associations. 77 However, in Parsons Col-
lege v. North Central Association of Colleges & Secondary Schools17
Judge Julius Hoffman of the Northern District of Illinois refused to in-
tervene in an action involving the expulsion of a school, holding that con-
stitutional protections do not apply to private associations and that the
procedures for disaccreditation were in accordance with the rules of the
Association. This decision, however, is highly questionable in that it
ignores the true nature of the function of an accrediting association, which
is, in fact, quasi-public.
The accrediting associations may be utilized in establishing an aca-
demic Ombudsman. A basic requirement for an education is the mainte-
dance of standards of academic freedom which can only function within the
context of academic due process. Therefore, a university must adhere to
the principles of academic freedom to receive accreditation. Clearly, ac-
crediting associations could properly establish means for investigating
disputes involving the application of principles of academic freedom as
174. Id.
175. Id. at 108; Marjorie Webster Jr. College Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges
and Secondary Schools, Civil No. 1515-66, U.S. Dist. Ct. D.C. (Complaint filed June 10, 1966).
176. Kaplin & Hunter, supra note 171, at 108-20.
177. Kaplin & Hunter, supra note 171.
178. 271 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. IM. 1967).
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applied both to faculty members and to students. The National Commis-
sion, working in cooperation with regional and professional accrediting
associations, the United States Office of Education, the AAUP and the
American Association of Universities, should formulate standards for
academic due process. Where disputes arise, complaints could be filed
with an Ombudsman attached to an appropriate regional association or
professional association which would investigate, mediate, render findings
and suggest means for compliance. The threat of disaccreditation would
secure compliance or the Ombudsman could initiate judicial relief on be-
half of the aggrieved party. The university administration would also be
accorded rights of appeal to review the findings of the Ombudsman within
the association and could also have ultimate judicial recourse.
The Writ of Habeas Scholastica, like the Writ of Habeas Corpus,
would be readily invoked by any member or group within the academic
community whose rights are adversely affected by administrative action.
The form of the Writ would be simple and could be asserted without assis-
tance of counsel, much like prisoners are capable of filing habeas corpus
writs pro se. The Writ would be a petition requesting the academic Om-
budsman to investigate the matter and take appropriate action.
Such an Ombudsman would be an effective bulwark for helping uni-
versities, beset with outside pressures, to adhere to principles of academic
due process. The threat of disaccreditation would strengthen the position
of universities confronted with legislative and other political pressure to
dismiss faculty or students who espouse unpopular political views or
engage in controversial political activities. The position of private univer-
sities would also be bolstered in its relation with alumni and certain
contributors.
With reference to students, the Ombudsman would help reduce ten-
sions and eliminate frustrations. As an institution, it would function as a
confessor, having a father image in advising students as to their rights and
in guiding them. Being independent of the administration, it would have
a cathartic effect by listening and evaluating students' complaints and in
exerting power to achieve what are found to be goals which accord with
principles of academic freedom. Though some students, adhering to the
ideas of Herbert Marcuse,' 79 may reject any solution within the context of
the present social system, many students will find the Ombudsman an
effective legal and democratic means for redress of grievances. The Om-
budsman may properly urge effective student participation in university
affairs as an application of principles of academic freedom and may also
demand the establishment of fair procedures regarding student discipline.
In many universities throughout the country, student disciplinary pro-
cedures have not been clearly formulated.""' This would be an area where
an academic Ombudsman could assume an effective role.
179. H. MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN (1962)."
180. A survey by Van AIstyne in Procedural Due Process and State University Students,
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Student participation in university decision-making is an effective
means for the protection of student rights. But such participation does
not mean student control of the university. Rather, it means student in-
fluence. A number of universities have granted students the right to exer-
cise authority in certain matters and in making policy for the university.'
The Ombudsman would also protect the rights of faculty members.
10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 368, 369 (1963), involving 72 universities revealed that 43% do not pro-
vide students with a reasonably clear and specific list which describes misconduct subject to
discipline; 53% do not provide students with a written statement specifying the nature of
the misconduct charged and only 17% provide such a statement at least ten days before the
determination of guilt or imposition of punishment; 16% do not even provide for a hearing
where students take exception to the charge of misconduct; 47% allow students or admin-
istrators who appear as witnesses or who bring the charge to sit on the hearing board if
they are otherwise a member; 30o do not allow the student charges to be accompanied by
an advisory of his choice during the hearing; 26% do not permit students to question wit-
nesses; 47% permit the hearing board to consider evidence which was improperly acquired,
e.g., removed by a university employee from a student's room absent an emergency justifying
such a procedure; but 90% provide for appeal, normally to a dean.
181. Developments in the Law, supra note 82 at 1157-59; Sherry, Governance of the
University: Rules, Rights and Responsibilities, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 23 (1966).
182. The Siege of Columbia, RAMPARTS at 27 (June 1968). In Ombudsmen Urged All
Over Country, New York Times, August 11, 1968, at 6 (late city ed.), it is reported:
Complaint officers whose job is to cut through bureaucratic red tape for ordinary
citizens would be established by all levels of government, if recommendations by a
conference co-sponsored by the University of California are followed.
The office of ombudsman, so named in Sweden, where it was first established,
is needed to "amplify the voice of the citizen in the halls of government," according
to the conference report by the Western American Assembly on the ombudsman,
held in Berkeley for 66 officials and political scientists.
The consensus report adopted by the conference urges that the ombudsman be
introduced at the Federal level "to humanize the remoteness and occasional harsh-
ness of this large bureaucracy."
Others should be chosen by the states, the report said, to cover branches of
their governments except the governor, legislature and judiciary. The ombudsman's
power, as defined in the report, is exerted through investigation, persuasion and
publicity. He would not be able to reverse decisions.
A symptom of the student revolts is the establishment of the Anti-University of London.
Established by left-wing intellectuals, the Anti-University has a range of student permis-
siveness that would shock the most informal don at Oxford.
Its founders and lecturers (or anti-lecturers) are largely American left-wing activists
and leaders of the British "underground" movement. Poets, painters, sculptors, pub-
lishers, writers, psycho-analysts, sociologists and historians meet here in a strange
atmosphere of "free thought" and "revolutionary ideas."
The anti-university was founded as the "answer to the intellectual bankruptcy and
spiritual emptiness of the educational establishment in England and the rest of the
Western world." The list of lectures exhibits a definite political leaning. All ambi-
valence ends when the visitor sees posters of the new martyr Che Guevara on the
walls, and press clippings about Vietnam war conscientious objectors on the tables.
Robin Alp, Now the Anti-University, ATLAS (September 1968) at 30-32. See generally
Anatomy of a Riot: An Analytical Symposium of the Causes and Effects of Riots, 45 J.
URBAN L. Nos. 3-4 (Spring-Summer 1968); Greenberg, The Supreme Court, Civil Riots and
Civil Dissonance, 77 YALE LJ. 1520-44 (1968); Comment, Judicial Control of the Riot
Curfew, 77 YALE L.J. 1560-73 (1968) ; B. W. Heineman, Tyranny of the Majority-Tyranny
of the Minority, 49 CHICAGO BAR RECORD, SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT 434-441 (Summer 1968);
Comment, Black Power Advocacy: Criminal Anarchy or Free Speech, 56 CALIF. L. REV.
No. 3 (May 1968); Comment, Kill or Be Killed?: Use of Deadly Force in the Riot Situation,
56 CALIF. L. REv. No. 3 (May 1968) ; A. Schlesinger, Jr., What is Behind the Student Re-
volts, SATURDAY EvENINm POST, Sept. 21, 1968, at 24, et seq.; M. Rudd, We Want Revolution,
SATURDAY EvENNG POST, Sept. 21, 1968, at 26, et seq.; and B. McGuire, It Wasn't Worth It,
SATuRDAY EvFNro POST, Sept. 21, 1968, at 27, et seq.
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In this role it would function in conjunction with the AAUP. A professor
could appeal to either the Ombudsman or the AAUP for assistance, and in
some cases the two could combine their efforts.
The assistance of the Ombudsman would be invoked by filing a Writ
of Habeas Scholastica which would allege the grievance and the relief
sought. Agents of the Ombudsman, stationed in communities having col-
leges or universities, would be readily available to process the complaints
and would proceed promptly. The confidence of the academic community
would have to be obtained through prompt and effective action.
The Ombudsman would also consider such controversies as university
involvement with the Pentagon and the defense establishment. It would
determine whether such involvement compromises the university's integ-
rity, and independence as an educational institution. If this involvement
means that the school would have to exclude certain professors as secur-
ity risks because of adherence to certain political outlooks or pursue
certain academic policies, a finding could be made whether academic free-
dom has been infringed. Moreover, the Ombudsman should also consider
the sentiment of the campus community. If the manifested opinion of the
student body and the faculty is opposed to such involvement because of
reasons of conscience, the Ombudsman could properly find a situation
which is not conducive to adherence to a climate of academic freedom
and a sense of community.
Similarly, the Ombudsman could consider such other university
policies as involvement with the surrounding community, such as the real
estate acquisitions by Columbia University in Harlem which has resulted
in community disruption. 8 2 Where this results in an environment of dis-
cord, a finding of nonadherence to academic due process might properly
be found.
IV. CONCLUSION
The world student unrest, a release of emotional frustrations result-
ing from a feeling of impotency in a highly depersonalized society, has
focused upon the university as an immediate target. The result is a ques-
tioning of established authority which can well result in an extension of
academic freedom by recognizing the rights of students to participate in
campus decision-making. The proposal for an academic Ombudsman
suggests a means for sublimating student unrest into a legal form. The
Ombudsman is a means for securing the rights of professors as well as
students in a manner which supplements judicial recourse and is more
efficient. The Ombudsman, unlike a court, is in a position to make wide
ranging inquiries and would have the expertise to suggest educational
reforms. It could well emerge as the tool for reforming and reorganizing
the multiversity and function as a buckler and shield for academic due
process.
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